Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore - 18 Cal. 3d 582, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473 (1976)

Rule:

Statutory notice and hearing provisions govern only ordinances enacted by city council action and do not limit the power of municipal electors, reserved to them by the California Constitution, to enact legislation by initiative.

Facts:

An association of persons interested in residential construction in a general law city brought suit to enjoin enforcement of an initiative ordinance, enacted by the voters of the city, prohibiting issuance of further residential building permits until local educational, sewage disposal, and water supply facilities complied with specific standards. The association contended that no compelling state interest justified the ordinance's infringement upon nonresidents' right to migrate to the city, and that the ordinance was in excess of the municipal police power. The trial court granted the injunction, however, on other grounds raised by the association, namely, that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and was precluded by a 1929 Supreme Court decision (Hurst v. Burlingame, 277 P. 308, 207 Cal. 134 (1929)), in which it was held that the notice and hearing provisions of the zoning law were applicable to zoning ordinances enacted by initiative, thus, in effect, preventing general law cities from adopting such ordinances. The municipality challenged the decision.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in granting the injunction on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and was precluded by the ruling in Hurst?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court, overruling its 1929 decision, reversed the judgment, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. The hearing and notice provisions of the zoning law, the Court held, were intended by the Legislature to apply to council action, not to the enactment of zoning initiatives, and by interpreting the ordinance to incorporate standards established by the joint school district and the regional water quality control board, the Court rendered the ordinance sufficiently specific to comply with constitutional standards. With regard to the alleged infringement of nonresidents' right to migrate to the city, the ordinance was subject, not to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review and a showing of a compelling state interest, but to review under the more liberal standards traditionally used for testing land use restrictions enacted under the municipal police power. In this connection, if a restriction significantly affected residents of surrounding communities, the constitutionality of the restriction must be measured by its impact not only upon the welfare of the enacting community, but also upon the welfare of the surrounding region. In the instant case, however, the record was limited to the pleadings and stipulations, and was devoid of evidence concerning the probable impact and duration of the ordinance's restrictions, which the association had the burden of documenting; until it met that burden, the ordinance retained its presumption of constitutionality.