Barber v. Gonzales - 347 U.S. 637, 74 S. Ct. 822 (1954)

Rule:

The word "entry" in § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 (Act) by its own force implies a coming from outside. The context shows that in order that there be an entry within the meaning of the Act there must be an arrival from some foreign port or place. There is no such entry where one goes to sea on board an American vessel from a port of the United States and returns to the same or another port of this country without having been in any foreign port or place.

Facts:

Respondent was born in the Philippine Islands in 1913 and came therefrom to the continental United States in 1930. He has lived here ever since. In 1941, he was convicted in the State of California of assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year in the Alameda County jail. In 1950, he was convicted in the State of Washington of second degree burglary and was sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law of that State to a minimum term of two years in the state penitentiary. In 1951, after an administrative hearing, he was ordered deported to the Philippine Islands under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who "after entry" had been sentenced more than once to imprisonment for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral turpitude. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, formerly 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). After respondent was taken into custody, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The petition attacked the validity of the deportation order on the ground, among others, that he was not subject to deportation under § 19 (a) since he had not made an "entry" within the meaning of that section. The District Court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to order respondent's release from custody.

Issue:

May respondent be deported under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who had been so sentenced "after entry"?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court affirmed and explained that "entry" in § 19 of the Act implies a coming from outside. The context shows that in order for there to be an entry within the meaning of the Act there must be an arrival from some foreign port or place. The court found that at the time respondent came to the United States, he was not arriving from some foreign port or place. He was a United States national moving from one of the possessions to the mainland. It was not until the 1934 Philippe Independence Act that Philippines could be regarded as "foreign" for immigration purposes. Thus, having made no "entry," respondent was not deportable under § 19 of the Act.