Baxter v. Palmigiano - 425 U.S. 308, 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976)

Rule:

U.S. Const. amend. V does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause. In criminal cases, where the stakes are higher and the State's sole interest is to convict, the judge and prosecutor are prohibited from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt. Disciplinary proceedings in state prisons, however, involve the correctional process and important state interests other than conviction for crime.

Facts:

Respondent state prison inmates in No. 74-1194 filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that procedures used in prison disciplinary proceedings violated their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that minimum notice and a right to respond are due an inmate faced even with a temporary suspension of privileges, that an inmate at a disciplinary hearing who is denied the privilege of confronting and cross-examining witnesses must receive written reasons or the denial will be deemed prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion, and that an inmate facing prison discipline for a violation that might also be punishable in state criminal proceedings has a right to counsel (not just counsel-substitute) at the prison hearing. Palmigiano, respondent state prison inmate in No. 74-1187,  upon being charged with inciting a prison disturbance, was summoned before prison authorities and informed that he might be prosecuted for a violation of state law, that he should consult an attorney (although the attorney would not be permitted to be present during the disciplinary hearing), and that he had a right to remain silent during the hearing but that if he did so his silence would be held against him. On the basis of the hearing, at which Palmigiano remained silent, he was placed in "punitive segregation" for 30 days. He then filed an action for damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the disciplinary hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an inmate at a prison disciplinary proceeding must be advised of his right to remain silent, that he must not be questioned further once he exercises that right, that such silence may not be used against him at that time or in future proceedings, and that where criminal charges are a realistic possibility prison authorities should consider whether defense counsel, if requested, should be permitted at the proceeding.

Issue:

Do inmates have a right to counsel or confrontation of witnesses in a prison disciplinary hearing?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that since prison disciplinary hearings were not criminal proceedings, prisoners had fewer rights, and the needs of the prisons needed to be balanced against any of respondents' rights. Thus, the inmates had no right to counsel or confrontation of witnesses. Moreover, prison officials could draw reasonable inference from an inmate's silence given the civil nature of the proceedings. The Court held that the record did not contain any indication that respondents needed any additional rights in their disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the Court reversed the judgments of the appellate courts.