Blyew v. United States - 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871)

Rule:

The crimes and offences of which the District Courts are, by the third section of the act of Congress of April 9th, 1866, given exclusive jurisdiction, are only those which are against the provisions of the act, or those enumerated in the second and sixth sections, and that the causes, civil and criminal, over which jurisdiction is, by the second clause of the section, conferred upon the District and Circuit Court of the United States concurrently, are other than those of which exclusive jurisdiction is given to the District Courts. They are described as causes affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State, or locality, where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section of the act.

Facts:

Defendants Blyew and Kennard were indicted for the murder of a colored woman named Lucy Armstrong. In order to show jurisdiction in the Circuit Court of the United States, the indictment averred that the victim was a citizen of the United States, having been born therein, and not subject to any foreign power; that she was of the African race, and was above the age of seventy-five years; that defendants were white persons; and that the alleged killing and murder were witnessed by two citizens of United States, born of African race. The lower court returned a verdict of guilty and overruled defendants' motion in arrest of judgment. Defendants brought a writ of error, raising, among others, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to rule upon the case. 

Issue:

Did the Circuit Court have jurisdiction of the offense charged in the indictment?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On review the court reversed because the case was not within the provisions of the act of Congress of April 9th, 1866. Therefore, the lower court had no jurisdiction of the crime of murder committed in the district of Kentucky, merely because two persons who witnessed the murder were citizens of the African race, and for that reason incompetent by the Revised Statutes of Kentucky, § 1, chapter 107, vol. 2, p. 470 (1860) to testify in the courts of that State. They were not persons affected by the cause. In addition, the jurisdiction of the lower court was not sustained by the fact averred in the indictment that the person murdered was a citizen of the African race, and for that reason denied the right to testify in the Kentucky courts. In no sense was she affected by the cause. Manifestly the act of Congress referred to persons in existence. She was the victim of the frightful outrage that gave rise to the cause, but she was beyond being affected by the cause itself.