Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. - 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021)

Rule:

In the context of circumstances to consider under § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.S. § 10301(b), the size of the burden imposed by a challenged voting rule is highly relevant. The concepts of openness and opportunity connote the absence of obstacles and burdens that block or seriously hinder voting, and therefore the size of the burden imposed by a voting rule is important. After all, every voting rule imposes a burden of some sort. Voting takes time and, for almost everyone, some travel, even if only to a nearby mailbox. Casting a vote, whether by following the directions for using a voting machine or completing a paper ballot, requires compliance with certain rules. But because voting necessarily requires some effort and compliance with some rules, the concept of a voting system that is equally open and that furnishes an equal opportunity to cast a ballot must tolerate the usual burdens of voting. Mere inconvenience cannot be enough to demonstrate a violation of § 2.

Facts:

The present cases involved challenges under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to aspects of the State of Arizona’s regulations governing precinct-based election-day voting and early mail-in voting. First, Arizonans who would vote in person on election day in a county that used the precinct system must vote in the precinct to which they were assigned based on their address. If a voter would vote in the wrong precinct, the vote will not be counted. Second, for Arizonans who vote early by mail, Arizona House Bill 2023 (HB 2023) made it a crime for any person other than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter's caregiver, family member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot--either before or after it has been completed. The Democratic National Committee and certain affiliates filed suit, alleging that both the State's refusal to count ballots cast in the wrong precinct and its ballot-collection restriction had an adverse and disparate effect on the State's American Indian, Hispanic, and African-American citizens in violation of §2 of the VRA. Additionally, they alleged that the ballot-collection restriction was “enacted with discriminatory intent” and thus violated both §2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment. The District Court rejected all of the plaintiffs' claims. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the en banc court reversed. It first concluded that both the out-of-precinct policy and the ballot-collection restriction imposed a disparate burden on minority voters because they were more likely to be adversely affected by those rules. The en banc court also held that the District Court had committed clear error in finding that the ballot-collection law was not enacted with discriminatory intent.

Issue:

Did the Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and HB 2023 violate §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that Arizona's out-of-precinct rule, which enforced the requirement that voters who chose to vote in person on election day had to do so in their assigned precincts, did not violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C.S. § 10301, because having to identify one's own polling place and then travel there to vote did not exceed the usual burdens of voting, and the racial disparity in burdens allegedly caused by the out-of-precinct policy was small in absolute terms. Moreover, the Court held that Arizona's ballot-collection law did not violate § 2 and was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose because plaintiffs were unable to provide statistical evidence showing that the law had a disparate impact on minority voters, and limiting the classes of persons who could handle early ballots to those less likely to have ulterior motives deterred potential fraud and improved voter confidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit was reversed and the case was remanded.