Brown v. Branch - 758 N.E.2d 48 (Ind. 2001)

Rule:

The Statute of Frauds does not define the term "sale." However, the law is settled that a right to the possession of real estate is an interest therein, and any contract that seeks to convey an interest in land is required to be in writing.

Facts:

Rhonda Branch and Clifford Brown were engaged in a ten-year on-again, off-again relationship. Sometime during that ten-year period, Brown purchased a home in Indiana, referred to as the “135 house.” The couple lived in the home for one year early in their relationship. In 1995, Branch moved to Missouri, found a job, and enrolled in a business school program. Shortly thereafter, Brown telephoned her and said that if she moved back to Indiana, Branch would “always have the 135 house.” When Brown reneged on his promise to convey the 135 house, Branch instituted the present action. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the house to Branch under the theory of promissory estoppel. On review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Brown’s oral promise to give Branch the house was not a sale within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds and therefore did not need to be in writing in order to be enforced. Brown appealed. 

Issue:

Did Brown’s promise to convey the house to Branch fall within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds? 

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts, holding that Brown’s promise fell within the Statute of Frauds because it was not in writing. In order to accept the promise, Branch quit her modest job, dropped out of college, and moved back to Indiana from Missouri where she had been living with her parents. She was inconvenienced as well as denied the benefit that the promise was intended to confer. However, she did not show that her reliance on the promise resulted in the infliction of an unjust and unconscionable injury and loss that would remove the promise from the operation of the Statute of Frauds.