Brunner v. Holloway - 2017-0674 (La. App. 1 Cir 11/2/17), 235 So. 3d 1153

Rule:

Defamation is a tort which involves the invasion of a person's interest in his or her reputation and good name. In Louisiana, there are four necessary elements to establish a defamation cause of action: 1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another, 2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, 3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher, and 4) resulting injury. If even one of the required elements of the tort is lacking, the cause of action fails. On the other, the tort of invasion of privacy is directed at redressing the damage which an individual suffers when legally recognized elements of his or her right to privacy have been violated. The right to privacy is defined in Louisiana as the right to be let alone. A tort of invasion of privacy can occur in four ways: 1) by appropriating an individual's name or likeness, 2) by unreasonably intruding on physical solitude or seclusion, 3) by giving publicity which unreasonably places a person in a false light before the public, and 4) by unreasonable public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.

Facts:

Appellants Baptiste Brunner et al., were students at Louisiana State University (LSU) and were also members of the LSU chapter of appellee fraternity, the Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity (the LSU chapter). The primary incident leading to this lawsuit occurred in November 2011, when appellee John F. Holloway made an online social media post. At that time, appellee was the Director of Chapter Services for Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity Incorporated. He made the post in question while travelling to conduct a membership review of the LSU chapter. According to appellee, the membership review included a meeting between himself and the fraternity members, as well as individual interviews between volunteers and the fraternity members. Appellants alleged that, at the meeting, appellee gave the fraternity members a choice to resign or take a drug test as part of the review process. Appellants further alleged that each of them submitted to the drug test and passed their individual drug tests. Few days after the membership review, a large number of the LSU Chapter's members were expelled from the fraternity, including members who passed their drug tests. Several more members were suspended or otherwise disciplined. Each of the disciplined members received a Notice of Disciplinary Action signed by appellee. Following the expulsions and suspensions, two newspapers published articles regarding these disciplinary actions. Appellants filed suit against appellees alleging that they were wrongfully expelled. They further alleged that appellee had defamed them in his online posting. And that because appellee was acting in the course and scope of his employment when the post was made, appellee fraternity was vicariously liable for his actions. Finally, appellants alleged that appellee’s post, along with the subsequent newspaper coverage, constituted an invasion of privacy. In September 2014, appellees filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and prescription, they specifically argued that appellants failed to state a cause of action for defamation or invasion of privacy. In regard to prescription, they argued that appellants failed to bring their suit within the one-year prescriptive period. Thus, appellants' defamation and invasion of privacy claims were prescribed. The trial court granted appellees' exception of prescription in part. Specifically, the trial court found that appellant's claims of defamation and invasion of privacy had prescribed as to appellee’s tweets, but not as to the disciplinary letters. The trial court also denied without prejudice, the appellees' exception of no cause of action as it relates to the disciplinary letters issued by appellee fraternity. Appellants then filed a motion for new trial but was denied. In May 2016, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that appellants failed to satisfy every essential element of their remaining claims for defamation and invasion of privacy, to which the trial court granted. The trial court further found that the disciplinary letters did not constitute defamation or invasion of privacy as a matter of law. From this judgment, appellants have appealed.

Issue:

Did the appellants failed to state a cause of action for their defamation and invasion of privacy action?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court held that appellants failed to state a cause of action for defamation because the appellee’s online social media post contained his subjective opinion. Also, this post contained a general statement, which was not explicitly directed at any individual, and as such, the post did not contain any provably false factual connotations. The court further explained that the post did not have reference to any particular individual or ascertainable person and did not refer to any group in particular. The court also ruled that appellants failed to state a cause of action for invasion of privacy because the appellee’s post did not place any of them in a false light before the public or disclose any private facts. That, the newspaper articles involved in the case centered around the expulsion of a large number of members of the fraternity, and the articles did not name any of the members involved in the lawsuit. Thus, the court vacated the summary judgment and judgment was rendered in favor of appellees.