Caetano v. Massachusetts - 577 U.S. 411, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016)

Rule:

The Court has held that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) and that this “Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States,” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010).

Facts:

After a bad altercation with an abusive boyfriend who put her in the hospital, petitioner Jaime Caetano found herself homeless and in fear for her life. She obtained multiple restraining orders against her abuser but they proved futile, so when a friend offered petitioner a stun gun for self-defense against her former boyfriend, petitioner accepted the weapon. One night after leaving work, petitioner found her ex-boyfriend waiting for her outside. Petitioner stood her ground and displayed the stun gun and announced something which made her abuser leave. When the police discovered the weapon, petitioner was arrested, tried, and convicted. The supreme judicial court upheld a Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns after examining whether a stun gun is the type of weapon contemplated by Congress in 1789 as being protected by the Second Amendment.

Issue:

Was the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts’ explanation in upholding the law contradicts the court’s precedent?

Answer:

Yes. The judgment of Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Conclusion:

This court, in the Heller case, held that Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding,” and that this “Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States. The court thus held that the explanations offered by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts for upholding the law, contradicted the court’s precedent. First, the court’s explanation that stun guns were not protected because they were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment; was inconsistent with Heller’s clear statement that the Second Amendment extends to arms that were not in existence at the time of the founding. Second, when next asked whether stun guns were dangerous per se at common law and unusual, the court concluded that stun guns were unusual because they were a thoroughly modern invention. Thus, by equating unusual with not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment, the court’s second explanation was the same as the first; inconsistent with Heller for the same reason. And lastly, the court used a contemporary lens and found nothing in the record to suggest that stun guns were readily adaptable to use in the military. But this court held that Heller rejected the proposition ruling “that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” For these three reasons, the explanation the Massachusetts court offered for upholding the law contradicts this court’s precedent. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.