Thank You For Submiting Feedback!
So long as a land use regulation does not constitute a physical taking or deprive a property owner of all viable economic use of the property, such a restriction does not violate the Takings Clause insofar as it governs a property owner's future use of his or her property, except in the unusual circumstance in which the use restriction is properly found to go too far and to constitute a regulatory taking. Where a restriction on the use of property would not constitute a taking of property without just compensation if imposed outside of the permit process, a permit condition imposing such a use restriction does not require a permit applicant to give up the constitutional right to just compensation in order to obtain the permit and thus does not constitute an exaction so as to bring into play the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
A building industry association challenged the City of San Jose's inclusionary housing ordinance (San Jose Mun. Code, §§ 5.08.010–5.08.730), which, among other features, required all new residential development projects of 20 or more units to sell at least 15 percent of the for-sale units at a price that was affordable to low- or moderate-income households. The trial court found that the conditions violated the takings clauses of U.S. Const., 5th Amend., and Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, and enjoined the city from enforcing the ordinance. The Court of Appeal reversed.
Did the City of San Jose's inclusionary housing ordinance violate the Takings Clause?
The court held that the City of San Jose's inclusionary housing ordinance, requiring new development projects to sell 15 percent of units at affordable prices was valid because there was no exaction under the Takings Clause and the City had the constitutionally valid purposes of increasing affordable housing and of locating such housing in economically diverse developments. When a municipality enacts an inclusionary housing ordinance to increase and disperse affordable housing, the validity of the ordinance does not depend on a showing that the restrictions are reasonably related to the impact of the particular development; rather, the restrictions must be reasonably related to the broad general welfare purposes for which the ordinance was enacted.