Camfield v. United States - 167 U.S. 518, 17 S. Ct. 864 (1897)

Rule:

The general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case. If it is found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers, to forbid all enclosures of public lands, the Government may do so, though the alternate sections of private lands are thereby rendered less available for pasturage. The inconvenience, or even damage, to the individual proprietor does not authorize an act which is in its nature a purpresture of government lands. While the United States Supreme Court does not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a State, which it would have within a Territory, the Court does not think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own protection. A different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.

Facts:

The Government filed an action to compel Daniel A. Camfield and William Drury to remove and abate a fence erected and maintained around 20,000 acres of public land. Camfield and Drury denied intending to monopolize the sections enclosed by the fence and sought to justify their actions upon the ground that they owned the adjoining sections and were engaged in building large reservoirs for the purpose of irrigating the land. An exception was filed to the answer upon the ground that it was insufficient to constitute a defense. The district court sustained the exception and entered a decree for the Government. The appellate court affirmed. 

Issue:

Is the act of February 25, 1885, c. 149, 23 Stat. 321, within the constitutional power of Congress to enact, and is therefore valid?

Answer:

Yes

Conclusion:

The court held that Camfield and Drury were within the letter of 23 Stat. 321. They enclosed public lands of the Government with no claim or color of title and without making a claim in good faith under the general laws of the United States. The fence was clearly a nuisance and it was within the constitutional power of Congress to order its abatement, notwithstanding such action might involve an entry upon the lands of a private individual. The Government had the same right to insist upon its proprietorship of its property that an individual would have to claim its property.