Campbell v. State - 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972)

Rule:

If a governmental body is negligent in performing a proprietary function, it will be liable for its negligence; while, if its activity is classified as governmental, the defense of sovereign immunity shall apply. 

Facts:

Two cases were consolidated for the purposes of appeal. The cases were decided separately in the Court of Appeals and were consolidated upon transfer to the Supreme Court. In the Campbell case the appellants sustained personal injuries as a result of a head-on collision with an automobile traveling in appellant's lane of traffic upon a state-maintained highway. In their complaint appellants alleged negligence on the part of the state in that, after repaving the highway, it failed to: (a) mark with a yellow line the aforesaid State Road 221 where it is unsafe to pass; and (b) carelessly and negligently failed to install no passing signs along Road 221 or any other signs indicating to the traveling public that the public highway was unsafe for passing. Appellants also contended that the road as maintained constituted a nuisance. On the other hand, in the Knotts case, the appellant sued the City of Indianapolis and the State of Indiana complaining that he sustained $ 100,000 in damages because of personal injuries incurred as the result of a fall on a crosswalk in Indianapolis. Appellant alleged that the injuries were the result of the negligent state of repair of the crosswalk. The fall occurred on the crosswalk at the intersection of Market Street and Monument Circle in Indianapolis. Monument Circle is a part of the state highway system and as such, the State of Indiana is responsible for its care and maintenance. In both Campbell and Knotts the state filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court alleging that there was no basis upon which relief could be granted premised upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In both cases the trial court sustained the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings. Thereafter, both appellants petitioned this court for transfer to resolve the status of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Indiana.

Issue:

 Does the State of Indiana still recognize the common law of sovereign immunity?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

Following the holding in Perkins v. State, all that remained of sovereign immunity was immunity on the part of the state from negligent acts occurring while the state was in performance of a solely "governmental function." Exactly what a governmental function constituted was not yet clearly defined. However, this court in Perkins recognized that municipal corporations and county governments had been eliminated from the scope of sovereign immunity as to tortious acts.

The state argued that elimination of the doctrine of sovereign immunity will impose a disastrous financial burden upon the state. Assuming there is any relevancy to this contention, the abrogation of sovereign immunity on the state level is consistent with conditions already existing in cities and counties in this state. If city and county governments can withstand the consequences of such liability, where traffic hazards seemingly are greater, the state should be able to also bear such burden. Additionally, the elimination of sovereign immunity means a more equitable distribution of losses in society caused by the government unto members of society, rather than forcing individuals to face the total loss of the injury.

The state further argued that abolition of sovereign immunity will result in a great number of problems for the state. Inability to collect payment for claims against the state, inability of the state to secure adequate insurance, and prospective legal chaos are cited as examples of some of these problems. The arguments which the state presents are questions which properly belong to the legislature in facing and solving the problems of liability. Such arguments do not apply to the doctrine in its present state.