Carter v. Abbyad - 299 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. App. 2009)

Rule:

Absent some sort of special relationship recognized in the law or voluntarily taking control of another with the other's reliance on that control, a person is not responsible for the tortious acts of another.

Facts:

Appellants Jennifer Carter and Eleanor Draughn were stabbed at a party by Dustin McManus, a companion of appellees Ramzi Abbyad, Jason Nuckolls, and Travis McLemore. The following narration was derived from the appellants’ allegations: while at the home of former codefendant Tyler Hunkin, appellees provided McManus with and/or watched him consume excessive amounts of illegal drugs including marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms in celebration of McManus's completion of a probation term. It is alleged that appellees knew that McManus consumed more than three times the "normal dose" of hallucinogenic mushrooms and knew that he had a knife. Appellants also assert that appellees knew that McManus's behavior grew more bizarre, threatening, and unpredictable as time passed, that he was having a "bad trip," and that he was a danger to himself and others. Appellants also allege that appellees were under the influence of illegal drugs and alcohol as well. Appellants claim that appellees decided to take McManus in this condition to a party on Halloween night to expose him to ridicule for their own amusement. They also allege that appellees did this despite knowing that these circumstances would expose McManus and other partygoers to danger. On the way to the party, appellants stopped at a convenience store to evaluate McManus's increasingly bizarre behavior. According to the petition, he was behaving "insanely" with a wild look in his eyes, was completely incoherent, and lacked the ability to communicate effectively. Nevertheless, appellees went on to the party with McManus. At the party, McManus's behavior allegedly grew still more bizarre and threatening toward himself and others. Eventually, appellants allege, McManus stabbed Abbyad, after which appellees fled. McManus then stabbed appellants Eleanor Draughn and Jennifer Carter, and others.

The stabbing victims and their parents--Bonnie Carter, Scott Carter, Andrew Draughn, and Susan Draughn--argue that they have alleged facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that appellees owed them a duty of care to have prevented the drug-addled and threatening McManus from coming into contact with unsuspecting guests at a party that the appellees attended. Appellees contend that the trial court correctly determined that the companions of an individual under the influence of behavior-altering drugs had no duty, based on the circumstances as alleged in this case, to protect others from that individual. The case was dismissed based on the pleadings. 

Issue:

Did the appellees have a legal duty to control McManus’ behavior that they consequently breached during the party?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

A problem with appellants’ allegations is that they are not specific about the nature of the risk posed, the foreseeability of the result, and the likelihood of injury. Unlike in Venetoulias, there is no allegation that McManus took the drugs while relying on appellees' promise that they would ensure his safety. While there is an allegation that McManus had a knife, appellants do not allege that appellees had reason to believe that McManus would use the knife to attack someone or that he was threatening to do so. For instance, there is no allegation that McManus was threatening to use the knife to hurt himself or others. Beyond general assertions of "threat" and "danger," the allegations do not set out what danger McManus posed to others that appellees should have reasonably been aware of and taken action to prevent before he actually started attacking party guests. There are not sufficient facts pleaded to support the imposition of a duty based on the foreseeability of McManus's ultimate actions and the perception of the likelihood of injury to others.

The argument for recognizing a duty in this case becomes more problematic when we consider the countervailing elements of the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. The social utility of McManus's consumption of drugs is zero. The utility of appellees taking McManus to the party is negligible, and nonexistent beyond not abandoning him at Hunkin's house. Beyond that, however, the undefined nature of the duty appellants would impose makes assessing its existence difficult. There is no showing that appellees had any right to control McManus. The magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury depends on the trigger and scope of the duty. Did the duty arise when appellees provided McManus with illegal drugs, when they saw him ingest them, when they recognized that he had consumed an inordinate amount, when they began to witness the results, when they chose to take him to the party, or when they elected not to monitor or attempt to control his conduct? Does the duty attach only if the observers provide him with the drugs, or when they transport a drug-addled person to a location where he will come into contact with others? Did they have a duty to keep him in the location where he consumed the drugs, or could they move him? When does the duty end? A potential consequence of imposing a duty on appellees at any of these points is that it might encourage future observers of drug intoxication to abandon intoxicated or drug-addled persons before a duty attaches lest they be held responsible for the intoxicated or drug-addled person's actions despite the fact that such a person's potential behavior is, by its nature, unpredictable.

In sum, appellants have not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that appellees owed them a duty to have attempted to control McManus's behavior or not transport him to the party under Texas law. Texas common law is fundamentally premised on individuals' responsibility for their own actions. The exceptions to that rule--e.g. employer-employee, parent-child--all involve situations where the defendant either had a recognized legal obligation to control the other person's conduct or the right to do so. These important factors are not present here. Although appellants argue for application of the duties described by the Restatement of Torts sections 321(1) and 324A and adopted by Texas courts, the duty described in section 319 more relevant to the facts in this case. While appellants do not expressly argue here for application of the duty described by section 319, that section more plainly and directly states the duty that appellants seek to impose through sections 321 and 324A.