Carter v. Reynolds - 175 N.J. 402, 815 A.2d 460 (2003)

Rule:

Under respondeat superior, an employer can be found liable for the negligence of an employee causing injuries to third parties, if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. To establish a master's liability for the acts of his servant, a plaintiff must prove (1) that a master-servant relationship existed and (2) that the tortious act of the servant occurred within the scope of that employment. Those are two entirely distinct concepts governed by different legal principles. The former focuses on the nature of the relationship. If no master-servant relationship exists, no further inquiry need take place because the master-servant relationship is sine qua non to the invocation of respondeat superior. If such a relationship exists, its margins are the subject of the scope of employment inquiry.

Facts:

The driver's job required her to work in her employer's office, and also to visit clients. On the day in question, the driver had made an off-site visit in her car and was returning home from the off-site location when the accident occurred. She was required to use her car for the visit. Plaintiff husband and wife sued defendants, the driver and the driver's employer, after the husband was injured in an auto accident allegedly caused by the driver's negligence. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the employer's respondeat superior liability. The Superior Court, Appellate Division (New Jersey), affirmed. The employer sought further review.

Issue:

May the doctrine of respondeat superior be invoked to hold an employer vicariously liable for the tort of an employee when the employee has an automobile accident on her way home from an off-site client's location and when she was required by her employer to use her personal car on mandatory client visits?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The supreme court found that a master-servant relationship plainly existed between the driver and her employer. Further, the driver's commute had a dual purpose insofar as it served both her interests and those of her employer. Her use of her personal automobile to advance her employer's business interests fell within the dual purpose, required-vehicle exception to the "going and coming rule" and placed her squarely both within the employment relationship and the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The supreme court declined the employer's invitation to adopt California's broad enterprise liability theory as the standard for respondeat superior, noting that when commutation by employees who were required to provide their own vehicles was concerned, the California rule was actually identical to the required-vehicle exception.