Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown - 554 U.S. 60, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008)

Rule:

Although the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et seq., itself contains no express preemption provision, Congress has implicitly mandated two types of preemption as necessary to implement federal labor policy. The first, known as Garmon preemption, is intended to preclude state interference with the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") interpretation and active enforcement of the integrated scheme of regulation established by the NLRA. To this end, Garmon preemption forbids states to regulate activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits. The second, known as Machinists preemption, forbids both the NLRB and states to regulate conduct that Congress intended be unregulated because left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces. Machinists preemption is based on the premise that Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collective bargaining, and labor disputes.

Facts:

California statute known as "Assembly Bill 1889" ("AB 1889") prohibits several classes of employers that receive state funds from using the funds "to assist, promote, or deter union organizing." The District Court found that Cal. Gov't Code §§ 16645.2 and 16645.7 were pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et seq., because they regulated employer speech about union organizing. The Court of Appeals concluded that Congress did not intend to preclude states from imposing such restrictions on use of state funds. 

Issue:

Did the NLRA pre-empt Cal. Gov't Code §§ 16645.2 and 16645.7?

Answer:

Yes

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court held that Machinists pre-emption applied because §§ 16645.2 and 16645.7 regulated within a zone protected and reserved for market freedom. The addition of 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(c) to the NLRA manifested congressional intent to encourage free debate on labor-management issues; § 158(c) expressly precluded regulation of non-coercive speech about unionization. The fact that the California statute restricted use rather than receipt of state funds did not significantly lessen the inherent potential for conflict with the NLRA. Certain federal statutory restrictions on union-related advocacy did not contract the NLRA's pre-emptive scope.