City of Miami v. McGrath - 824 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002)

Rule:

The Florida Constitution defines a special law as a special or local law. Fla. Const. art. X, § 12(g). A special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification is illegal. 

Facts:

In 1999, the Florida Legislature enacted section 218.503(5), which authorizes a municipality to impose a parking tax but restricts which municipalities may impose the tax. In July 1999, the City of Miami ("City") implemented the statute by passing an ordinance authorizing the levying of a parking tax, which became effective September 1, 1999. Patrick McGrath, III, filed a complaint against the City, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance and section 218.503(5)(a). McGrath claimed that the statute constitutes a special law passed under the guise of a general law, and thus is unconstitutional under article VII, sections 1(a) and 9(a), of the Florida Constitution.  Miami-Dade County ("County"), and one of its employees, Laureen Varga, challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance and section 218.503(5)(a) in another case, and intervened as plaintiffs in this case. The City and McGrath filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the County and Varga joined in support of McGrath's motion. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance and section 218.503(5)(a). The Third District reversed, however, holding that section 218.503(5)(a) is an unconstitutional special law.

Issue:

Did section 218.503(5)(a), which authorizes only certain municipalities to impose a parking tax, constitute a special law in violation of the Florida Constitution?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court  affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and disagreed with the City’s contention that Fla. Stat. ch. 218.503(5)(a) was valid. First, the population classification was nothing more than a descriptive technique used to identify three particular municipalities to which the statute applied. Limiting the statute as such was tantamount to restricting it to those particular municipalities that met the population threshold on the effective date. Second, the statute did not operate uniformly among similarly situated municipalities because it did not apply to all municipalities. As a result of the combination of the population threshold and the limiting date, the statute by its express terms forever excluded any other municipalities that increased in size to meet the population threshold after said date. Third, the statute employed an arbitrary classification scheme because it contained a classification incapable of generic application, and fixed so as to preclude additional entities from satisfying the requirements for inclusion at some future point in time.