Commonwealth v. Matsos - 421 Mass. 391, 657 N.E.2d 467 (1995)

Rule:

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43 (1992) provides, in part, as follows: (a) Whoever willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a threat with the intent to place that person in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury shall be guilty of the crime of stalking.

Facts:

Defendant George Matsos wrote many letters to the victim that were sexually explicit and threatening and which detailed events of her life of which defendant should not have had any knowledge. Defendant was charged with stalking the victim in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43 (1992). Following the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty, which the district court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted. Nearly one year after the defendant was convicted, the court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 637 N.E.2d 854 (1994), which held the stalking statute, as enacted, to be unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the defendant argued that his motion for a required finding of not guilty was improperly denied because the Commonwealth's proof was insufficient to show that he had made threats with the intent to place the victim in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury. Alternatively, the defendant argued that his conviction must be reversed because he was entitled to retroactive application of the decision in Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski.

Issue:

1. Was the Commonwealth’s proof insufficient to show that defendant made threats with intent to place the victim in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury, thereby making it an error to deny defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty?
2. Must the defendant’s conviction be reversed on the strength of the doctrine enunciated in Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 637 N.E.2d 854 (1994)?

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The Court noted that in considering a denial of a motion for required finding of not guilty, courts would view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. To obtain a conviction under G. L. c. 265, § 43, the prosecution must prove that the defendant made a threat with the intent to place the victim in imminent fear of death or bodily injury. In this case, the Court concluded that the amount and content of the letters that defendant sent to the victim allowed the jury to conclude that defendant intended to place the victim in fear of imminent bodily injury and that the victim was afraid of defendant. Anent the second issue, the Court noted that a defendant whose case was on direct appeal when a new rule was announced is entitled to retroactive application of that rule or principle of criminal law only if the issue was raised at trial. Because defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of § 43 at his trial, the Court could only consider whether defendant's conviction under the statute as enacted, created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Regardless of the vagueness of portions of the statute, defendant's conduct was clearly prohibited harassment. The statute gave the defendant fair notice that his repeated, obsessive behavior, which interfered with the victim's personal and professional lives, was prohibited. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction under the stalking statute.