Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko - 534 U.S. 61, 122 S. Ct. 515 (2001)

Rule:

The implied damages action first recognized in Bivens does not extend to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons.

Facts:

Petitioner Correctional Services Corporation, a private corporation, operated a halfway house under contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Respondent John E. Malesko, a federal prison inmate who had been transferred to the halfway house was assigned to quarters on the fifth floor and was exempted, on account of a heart condition, from a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the staircase rather than the elevator. Nevertheless, on one occasion an employee of the corporation allegedly forbade respondent to use the elevator, and the respondent then climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, fell, and sustained an injury. The respondent, alleging negligence, filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the corporation and various corporate employees. The District Court, treating the complaint as raising claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 29 L Ed 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), for violation of federal constitutional rights, dismissed the suit and reasoned in part that a Bivens action could be maintained against only an individual, not a corporate entity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part and remanded. It asserted that private entities such as the corporation in question ought to be held liable under Bivens to accomplish the Bivens goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.

Issue:

Could a Bivens action be maintained against private entities to provide a remedy for constitutional violations?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court held that no implied private right of action for damages against private entities alleged to have violated a citizen's federal constitutional rights under color of federal law would be recognized--and that the halfway-house inmate was therefore not allowed recovery against the corporation under a Bivens claim because: (i) the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by the Bivens decision, the purpose of which was to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations; (ii) no federal prisoners enjoyed the remedy contemplated by the halfway-house inmate, as a federal prisoner in a BOP facility was not permitted to bring a Bivens claim against the United States or the BOP with respect to an alleged constitutional deprivation by an individual officer; and (iii) alternative remedies were at least as great, and in many respects greater, than anything that could be had under the Bivens decision.