Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing - 551 U.S. 264, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007)

Rule:

Where possible, courts should reconcile the operation of both antitrust and securities statutory schemes rather than holding one completely ousted. The United States Supreme Court has set forth a standard, namely that repeal of the antitrust laws is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.

Facts:

Respondent investors filed suit, alleging that petitioner investment banks, acting as underwriters, violated antitrust laws when they formed syndicates to help execute initial public offerings for several hundred technology-related companies. Respondents claim that the underwriters unlawfully agreed that they would not sell newly issued securities to a buyer unless the buyer committed (1) to buy additional shares of that security later at escalating prices (known as "laddering"), (2) to pay unusually high commissions on subsequent security purchases from the underwriters, or (3) to purchase from the underwriters other less desirable securities (known as "tying"). The underwriters moved to dismiss, claiming that federal securities law impliedly precludes application of antitrust laws to the conduct in question. The District Court dismissed the complaints, but the Second Circuit reversed.

Issue:

Do the applicable securities law herein impliedly precludes the application of antitrust laws?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

First, the activities in question here--the underwriters' efforts jointly to promote and to sell newly issued securities--is central to the proper functioning of well-regulated capital markets. The IPO process supports new firms that seek to raise capital; it helps to spread ownership of those firms broadly among investors; it directs capital flows in ways that better correspond to the public's demand for goods and services. Moreover, financial experts, including the securities regulators, consider the general kind of joint underwriting activity at issue in this case, including road shows and bookbuilding efforts essential to the successful marketing of an IPO. Thus, the antitrust complaints before the court concern practices that lie at the very heart of the securities marketing enterprise.

Second, the law grants the SEC authority to supervise all of the activities here in question. Indeed, the SEC possesses considerable power to forbid, permit, encourage, discourage, tolerate, limit, and otherwise regulate virtually every aspect of the practices in which underwriters engage. Private individuals who suffer harm as a result of a violation of pertinent statutes and regulations may also recover damages. 

Last, the SEC has continuously exercised its legal authority to regulate conduct of the general kind now at issue. It has defined in detail, for example, what underwriters may and may not do and say during their road shows. It has brought actions against underwriters who have violated these SEC regulations. And private litigants, too, have brought securities actions complaining of conduct virtually identical to the conduct at issue here; and they have obtained damages.

In sum, an antitrust action in this context is accompanied by a substantial risk of injury to the securities markets and by a diminished need for antitrust enforcement to address anticompetitive conduct. Together these considerations indicate a serious conflict between application of the antitrust laws and proper enforcement of the securities law. The Solicitor General's proposal to avoid this conflict does not convincingly address these concerns.