Naghi v. Brener - 08-2527 ( La. 06/26/09), 17 So. 3d 919

Rule:

While the relation back of a pleading may not technically interrupt or suspend a prescriptive or peremptive period in the sense contemplated by La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3462-3472, there can be no escaping the fact that relation back interferes with the operation of the prescriptive or peremptive time period in that it avoids its operation. That is the primary importance of La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1153. Because nothing may interfere with the running of a peremptive period, and avoiding the peremptive period certainly interferes with the running of that period, relation back of an amended or supplemental pleading adding a plaintiff is not allowed to avoid the running of a peremptive period such as that found in La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:5605. Further, the relation back theory assumes that there is a legally viable claim to which the pleading can relate back. Prescription only prevents the enforcement of a right by legal action, it does not terminate the natural obligation. Peremption, however, destroys the cause of action itself. Because the cause of action no longer exists after the termination of the peremptive period and any right to assert the claim is destroyed, there is nothing to which an amended or supplemental pleading filed after the peremptive period has expired can relate back.

Facts:

The defendant attorney allowed a claim belonging to the clients' corporation to become prescribed. When the clients filed suit, the attorney argued that the property subject to the prescribed claim was actually owned by a corporation, and not by the clients personally. The clients amended their petition to add the corporation. However, in the meantime, the one-year peremptive period of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:5605 had expired. The clients argued that the relation-back period provided in La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1153 meant that their claim was timely. The trial court denied the attorney's exception of peremption and motion for summary judgment based on La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:5605, and the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans (Louisiana), affirmed. The attorney appealed.

Issue:

Can an amended and supplemental petition adding a plaintiff relate back to the original petition in this case? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the trial court to grant the attorney's exception of peremption. The court held that while the clients’ original petition was timely filed within one year, that petition was brought on behalf of parties that had no right of action to bring the claim. After the one-year period had run, the petition was amended to name the corporate owner of the property. Because the original petition was brought by a party with no right of action to sue, the amended petition did not relate back to the original petition. Peremption, unlike prescription, could not be interrupted by the filing of the original petition, because it destroyed the clients' cause of action, pursuant to La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3458.