Dills v. Enfield - 210 Conn. 705, 557 A.2d 517 (1989)

Rule:

The Trial Court has the power to render whatever judgment appropriately follows, as a matter of law, from the facts found by an attorney trial referee. The non-delegable judicial duty to render judgments is not limited to endorsement of the decision recommended by the referee. The Court shall render such judgment as the law requires upon the facts in the report as it may be corrected.

Facts:

The town of Enfield instructed its development agency to solicit private developers for the Enfield Memorial Industrial Park to be constructed on town property. Pursuant to an earlier option agreement, he plaintiff Dills and the development agency entered into a contract for the sale of the land to be developed. Dills at that time paid a $ 100,000 deposit toward the contract price of $ 985,900. The plaintiff Neecon Corporation, owned by Dills, was to perform the necessary work. Under the terms of the contract, the development agency agreed to convey the property to the developer sixty days after the fulfillment of two conditions: (1) the submission and approval of construction plans in accordance with section 301 of the contract; and (2) the submission of evidence of financial capacity in accordance with section 304 of the contract. The agency was allowed to terminate the contract, retaining the liquidated damages, if the developer failed to submit acceptable construction plans. Dills never submitted construction plans that were acceptable to the agency because, despite diligent efforts, he was unable to obtain mortgage financing. Both parties subsequently invoked the contract’s termination clauses. Plaintiffs then sued the defendants to recover the $100,000 deposit Dills paid the agency. The trial court referred the case to a state trial referee, which recommended that judgment be entered for the plaintiffs. The trial court rejected the referee's recommendation, instead rendering judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue:

1. Did the Trial Court exceed its authority when it ruled contrary to the recommendation of the state trial referee?
2. Did the doctrine of commercial impracticability excuse the agency from submitting construction plans when it discovered that necessary financing had become unavailable?

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The Court first held that the Trial court had the inherent authority to render whatever judgment was appropriate in light of the facts found by the attorney trial referee. The Court held that there was no procedural impediment to the Trial Court's exercise of this jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the trial court did not exceed its authority by impermissibly engaging in fact-finding contrary to the report of the referee. The Court found that the doctrine of impracticability and impossibility was not relevant. The fact that preparing the construction plans would have cost the individual a great deal of money did not excuse the individual from submitting them as the contract provided. The Court held that only in exceptional circumstances could the duty to perform have been discharged because additional financial burdens made performance less practical than initially contemplated.