Dixon v. United States - 548 U.S. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2437 (2006)

Rule:

It is up to the federal courts to effectuate the affirmative defense of duress as Congress "may have contemplated" it in an offense-specific context. In the context of the crimes of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(n) and making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of § 922(a)(6), the United States Supreme Court presumes that Congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proving the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.

Facts:

Petitioner, in purchasing firearms at gun shows, provided an incorrect address and falsely stated that she was not under indictment for a felony. As a result of these acts, she was charged with receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(n) (conviction of which required, through 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(a)(1)(D), that the defendant had acted "willfully") and with making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(a)(6) (conviction of which required that the defendant had acted "knowingly"). At trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the petitioner admitted that, when she purchased the guns, she knew that she was under indictment and knew that her purchases were crimes; but offered the defense that she had acted under duress because her boyfriend had threatened to harm her and her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him. The District Court declined the petitioner's request for a jury instruction that would have placed on the government the burden to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the duress defense. Rather, the trial judge instructed the jury that the petitioner had the burden to establish her defense by a preponderance of the evidence. She was convicted of violating both § 922(n) and § 922(a)(6), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions. Petitioner challenged the decision.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that petitioner had the burden to establish her defense of duress?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the jury instruction requiring the accused to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence was not erroneous, as the instruction did not violate the due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment, for the instruction was consistent with the requirement that for convictions under the statutes in question, it was the defendant's specific mental state of acting "knowingly" or "willfully," rather than an "evil mind" or "criminal intent," that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, as to the common law, it long had required the defendant to bear the burden of proving duress. In the context of the firearms offenses at issue--as would usually be the case, given the long-established common-law rule--the Supreme Court presumed that Congress intended the accused to bear the burden of proving the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.