Dowling v. United States - 473 U.S. 207, 105 S. Ct. 3127 (1985)

Rule:

The statutory language of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2314, providing that the goods, wares, or merchandise transported be the same as those stolen, converted or taken by fraud, contemplates a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods.

Facts:

Title 18 U. S. C. § 2314 provides criminal penalties for any person who "transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $ 5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud." Paul Edmond Dowling was convicted in Federal District Court of violating, inter alia, § 2314, arising from the interstate transportation of "bootleg" phonorecords that were manufactured and distributed without the consent of the copyright owners of the musical compositions performed on the records. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Dowling sought review of his conviction on the ground that sound recordings that concededly violated copyright law did not constitute stolen or converted goods within the coverage of the statute.

Issue:

Is the National Stolen Property Act (18 USCS 2314) applicable to interstate transportation of "bootleg" records?

Answer:

No

Conclusion:

The court held that the copyright infringement committed by petitioner did not equate to the theft, conversion, or fraud contemplated by Congress in enacting § 2314. The court noted that criminal statutes were to be strictly construed, and that an examination of the language and legislative history of § 2314, as well as of the criminal provisions of the copyright laws, mandated the conclusion that Dowling’s conduct was not within the statutory prohibition. The phonorecords in question were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" for purposes of § 2314. The section's language clearly contemplates a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods. Since the statutorily defined property rights of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or] merchandise," interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud. The infringer of a copyright does not assume physical control over the copyright nor wholly deprive its owner of its use. Infringement implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud.