Estate of Oaks v. Stouff (In re Estate of Oaks) - 2020 WI App 29, 392 Wis. 2d 352, 944 N.W.2d 611

Rule:

The general rule is that a testamentary disposition (a disposition that takes effect upon the death of the person making the disposition) must comply with the statutory requirements for the execution of wills. However, a gift causa mortis operates as an exception to that general rule. Under the doctrine of gift causa mortis, a gift made during the life of the donor becomes effective upon the donor's death if certain requirements are met. Specifically, in order to establish a gift causa mortis, a claimant must prove that: (1) the donor had an intention to make a gift effective at death; (2) the donor made the gift with a view to the donor's death from present illness or from an external and apprehended peril; (3) the donor died of that ailment or peril; and (4) there was a delivery of the gifted property.

Facts:

Defendant Lynne Stouff and decedent David Oaks were in a romantic relationship for over twenty-three years—from February 1995 until Oaks' death on March 8, 2018. They never married, but they lived together for approximately ten years—from 2008 until Oaks' death. Oaks had been divorced twice and had an adult daughter, Cheri Wardell, who was not Stouff's offspring. It is undisputed that Oaks and Wardell did not have a "close relationship" and were "estranged for many years" prior to Oaks' death. In the early morning hours of March 8, 2018, Oaks fatally shot himself in the head in the home he shared with Stouff, while Stouff was asleep upstairs. Stouff woke when she heard a loud bang, and when she went downstairs to investigate,  she found two handwritten notes on a table. The first note read:

”3-7-18

Lynne Stouff has been my companion and my crutch for a long while. 

As I leave this existence I want all worldly belongings to be assigned to Lynne.

David Oaks”

The second note read: “Lynne—This is all I can go with this—Thank you for being there for me all these years. I love you.” It is undisputed that Oaks died intestate—that is, without a valid will. It is further undisputed that Oaks died unmarried and that Wardell was his only child. As such, Oaks' entire estate would normally pass to Wardell under the general rules of intestate succession, as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 852.01. Thus, Wardell filed a petition for formal administration of Oaks' estate on May 23, 2018. An order for formal administration was issued two days later, and Wardell was named the Estate's personal representative. Stouff subsequently filed several claims against the Estate. As relevant to this appeal, Stouff contended she was entitled to Oaks' entire estate under the doctrine of gift causa mortis based on the first note Oaks left before he died. Stouff also alleged the Estate was required to reimburse her for $4760.51 in payments she had made on behalf of the Estate, comprised of: (1) a $100 payment she made toward the balance owing on one of Oaks' credit cards; (2) premium payments totaling $373 for insurance on Oaks' property; and (3) payments totaling $4284.51 for funeral expenses. The Estate denied Stouff's claim for the entirety of Oaks' estate based on the doctrine of gift causa mortis. As for Stouff's claim for reimbursement, the Estate agreed to reimburse Stouff for cremation expenses in the amount of $2267, but it refused to reimburse her for the rest of her claimed expenses. Stouff subsequently moved for summary judgment on her claims against the Estate. In support of her motion, she submitted her own affidavit and her attorney's affidavit, both of which included attached exhibits. The Estate filed its own motion for summary judgment on Stouff's claims and also filed a brief in response to Stouff's summary judgment motion. The circuit court ultimately issued a written decision granting Stouff's summary judgment motion and denying the Estate's motion. Based upon the undisputed facts, the court determined Stouff had established each of the elements of a gift causa mortis, and she was therefore entitled to the entirety of Oaks' estate. The court also determined Stouff was entitled to reimbursement from the Estate for all of her claimed expenses. However, the court awarded Stouff only $4287.51 in expenses, rather than the $4760.51 she had claimed. The Estate now appeals, arguing the court erred by granting Stouff's summary judgment motion.

Issue:

 Is Stouff entitled to summary judgment on her claim for Oaks’ entire estate under the doctrine of gift causa mortis?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

While the Estate concedes that no Wisconsin case to date has addressed this issue, it asserts that "[h]istorically, the common law has maintained that a gift causa mortis made in contemplation of the donor's suicide is void." The Estate further contends that various other jurisdictions have followed this historical rule and have held that "death by suicide does not satisfy the requirement that a gift be made in expectation of imminent death from illness or impending peril." The Estate's argument in this regard was not persuasive. In making its argument, the Estate fails to distinguish between the manner of a donor's death and the ultimate cause of the donor's death. While the manner of death may be suicide, that suicide may, in some cases, have been caused by a present mental illness—for instance, depression. Accordingly, even in a case in which the donor died by suicide, a party may be able to show that the donor made a gift in expectation of his or her death from a present mental illness, and that the present mental illness caused the donor's death. Thus, contrary to the Estate's contention, the fact that a donor died by suicide does not automatically prevent a party from establishing that the donor made a gift causa mortis. The court also found persuasive cases from other jurisdictions, in which the courts concluded a gift causa mortis had occurred where the donor's suicide was the result of a present mental illness. he Michigan Supreme Court concluded the donor's purchase of stock in his brother's name was a gift causa mortis. The court stated in In re Van Wormer’s estate that a gift causa mortis "cannot be sustained unless it appears from the record that at the time of the transaction the donor believed he was suffering from an affliction from which he might not recover and from which in fact he did not." The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Scherer v. Hyland. The court explained: “While it is true that a gift causa mortis is made by the donor with a view to impending death, death is no less impending because of a resolve to commit suicide. Nor does that fixed purpose constitute any lesser or less imminent peril than does a ravaging disease. Indeed, given the despair sufficient to end it all, the peril attendant upon contemplated suicide may reasonably be viewed as even more imminent than that accompanying many illnesses which prove ultimately to be fatal. And, the notion that one in a state of mental depression serious enough to lead to suicide is somehow "freer" to renounce the depression and thus the danger than one suffering from a physical illness, although it has a certain augustinian appeal, has long since been replaced by more enlightened views of human psychology.” Like the Michigan and New Jersey Supreme Courts, the court herein concludes that a gift causa mortis can occur in a case where the donor died by suicide as a result of a present mental illness. It thus rejects the Estate's assertion that a gift causa mortis can never be enforced in a case where the donor died by suicide.

In its reply brief, the Estate argues that even if a gift causa mortis can occur in a case where the donor's suicide was caused by a present mental illness, the evidence here did not establish that was the case. The court disagrees. In support of her summary judgment motion, Stouff submitted evidence that: (1) Oaks was a Vietnam War veteran and was exposed to "Agent Orange" during his military service; (2) Oaks had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder by a treatment provider and was prescribed an anti-depressant medication on at least one occasion; (3) during the months before his death, Oaks repeatedly complained to Stouff and others of pressure and pain in his head; (4) Oaks was convinced there was a physical problem in his brain that was "causing his various mental health ailments"; (5) Oaks "finally convinced the VA to schedule him an appointment with neurology to get his head scanned and evaluated," but he died before that appointment took place; and (6) Oaks' death certificate listed his cause of death as "SELF INFLICTED GUNSHOT WOUND TO HEAD ... Due to or as a consequence of 'DEPRESSION.'" In this case, it is undisputed that Oaks made a gift to Stouff in anticipation of his own death by suicide. In addition, the facts set forth above, if uncontradicted, would establish: (1) that Oaks was suffering from a mental illness at the time of his death—specifically, depression; and (2) that Oaks' mental illness caused his suicide. Accordingly, Stouff established a prima facie case for summary judgment with respect to the second and third requirements for a gift causa mortis.