Farrar v. Swedish Health Spa - 337 So. 2d 911 (La. Ct. App. 1976)

Rule:

La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2301: He who receives what is not due to him, whether he receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom he has unduly received it.

Facts:

Plaintiff Cindy Farrar, a minor, signed a two-year contract with the defendant Oak Park Swedish Health Spa and charged the membership fee to her father's credit card. Plaintiff never used the facilities or services of the defendant subsequent to the date of the Agreement, and consequently, filed a petition for restitution. Plaintiff’s father intervened, alleging an interest in the action because he paid the charge. Plaintiff and plaintiff’s father moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in not applying an estoppel theory to prevent the father from taking advantage of the daughter's minority to recover the amount paid, and in not finding that plaintiff’s payment of a natural obligation ratified it and barred suit for recovery.

Issue:

1. Did the plaintiff’s payment of the Master Charge bill operate as an estoppel that barred the present action for restitution?
2. Did the plaintiff’s payment of a natural obligation ratify the contract, thereby barring suit for recovery?

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The Court noted that estoppels were not favored in Louisiana. To rely on estoppel, the defendant would have to show that it had changed its position to its detriment in reliance on plaintiff’s action. In this case, there was no indication of either justifiable reliance or a change in position, and the defendant cannot avail itself of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Anent the second issue, the Court noted that while a minor can validly contract for necessaries for his support or education and can accept a contract of mandate under certain circumstances, the present case did not deal with necessities, and the record did not indicate whether a mandate theory was applicable. There was no evidence that Cindy was authorized to use her father's credit card and no indication of the way in which she obtained it; thus, there was no ratification by plaintiff after majority. Furthermore, the Court held that no ratification was intended by the father. Had the father intended a ratification of the agreement by his payment, plaintiff would presumably have availed herself of the benefits purchased. However, since it was the father and not plaintiff who paid, the Court found that the judgment incorrectly gave judgment to both. Therefore, the judgment was amended to omit the name of the plaintiff as a party entitled to judgment.