Fulton v. City of Phila. - 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019)

Rule:

The Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes). Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. Among other things, this means that religious or conscientious objections do not supersede the basic obligation to comply with generally applicable civil rights laws provided those laws are applied neutrally. While religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.

Facts:

A reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer informed the City of Philadelphia's Department of Human Services in March 2018 that two of its agencies would not work with same-sex couples as foster parents. Human Services investigated this allegation, which it considered a violation of the City's anti-discrimination laws. When the agencies confirmed that, because of their religious views on marriage, they would not work with gay couples, Human Services ceased referring foster children to them. One of those agencies, Catholic Social Services (sometimes abbreviated to "CSS"), brought the present action claiming that the City has violated its rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses, as well as under Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act. It sought an order requiring the City to renew their contractual relationship while permitting it to turn away same-sex couples who wished to be foster parents. CSS sought preliminary injunctive relief to this effect from the District Court, which the court denied. CSS appealed.

Issue:

Did the Religious organization demonstrate that the City transgressed fundamental guarantees of religious liberty, thereby warranting the grant of injunctive relief?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the Religious organization that provided foster care services to a city and had a policy of turning away same-sex couples was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on its First Amendment Free Exercise claim challenging the city’s cessation of foster referrals because the city acted in a neutral way to enforce its non-discrimination policy. The organization failed to make a persuasive showing that the city targeted it for its religious beliefs, or was motivated by ill will against its religion rather than a sincere opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Moreover, the District court did not abuse its discretion in also finding that the organization had not shown a likelihood of success on its Establishment Clause claim because there was no evidence that the city's actions were a veiled attempt to coerce or impose certain religious beliefs on the organization. Accordingly, the decision denying injunctive relief was affirmed.