Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert - 429 U.S. 125, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976)

Rule:

While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification. Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of disability legislation on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.

Facts:

Female employees, who had been denied disability benefits under their employer's disability plan while they were absent from work as a result of pregnancy, instituted an action against the employer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, contending that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the disability plan constituted sex discrimination in violation of 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS 2000e-2(a)(1)). The District Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disability benefits from the disability plan violated Title VII (375 F Supp 367), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Issue:

Was the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the disability plan discriminatory?

Answer:

No

Conclusion:

The Court found that the Title VII analysis should parallel that for equal protection, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, and that, consequently, the plan was not discriminatory. The Court found that discrimination had not been shown to exist either by the terms of the plan or by its effect, although the Court recognized that only the female employees could become pregnant. However, the Court found that pregnancy was not a disease but rather a condition that an employer could opt out of insuring without committing an unlawful employment practice. The Court also held that 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975), stating that pregnancy was to be treated as any other temporary disability, was not controlling and, in fact, conflicted with other regulations and the legislative history governing Title VII.