Godesky v. Provo City Corp. - 690 P.2d 541 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1984)

Rule:

A distributor of electricity owes a high degree of care to protect people and property. The degree of care must be equal to the degree of danger involved. A high degree of duty is upon one who transmits electricity in high tension wires to see that no harm befalls a person rightfully in proximity thereto when that person is himself guilty of no wrongdoing. In other words, the highest degree of care must be used to prevent harm from coming to others.

Facts:

Plaintiff James Godesky was hired by Pride Roofing Company to work on a two-or three-day roof repair at defendant’s apartment building. Plaintiff had no experience with electrical wires. During the second day of plaintiff’s employment, plaintiff’s supervisors told plaintiff to tie off the lower wire to the upper wire. When plaintiff grasped the top wire with both hands, he received a shock of 2,400 volts. Defendant Provo City owned and operated the electrical system that included the wire grasped by the plaintiff. The trial court determined that the worker was not negligent, that the city was negligent and 70 percent responsible for causing the accident, and that another defendant, the building owner, was negligent and 20 percent responsible for causing the accident. Defendant city challenged the decision of the trial court, arguing that the court erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that Pride’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. Moreover, defendant city claimed that it was unduly prejudiced when the court’s instruction allocated an equal burden on both parties.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, did the trial court err in finding defendant city 70 percent responsible for causing the accident resulting in plaintiff’s injury?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On appeal, the court affirmed and found no error prejudicial to the city. The court held that the trial court acted properly when it refused to rule as a matter of law that the roofing company's negligence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The instructions given by the trial court adequately covered the issues and were correct statements of law. Many of the city's proffered instructions were incorrect and it could not claim prejudice by the failure to give them. The city's objection to one instruction was insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal because it did state distinctly the matter to which it objected and the grounds for the objection, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 51. The instruction regarding the city's degree of care did not prejudicially exaggerate the city's duty.