Graybill v. Lampman - 2014 WY 100, 332 P.3d 511

Rule:

To establish adverse possession, a party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the disputed parcel which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title. Possession must be for the statutory limitation period of 10 years. The test for adverse possession in a mistaken boundary case imposes shifting burdens upon the parties: When there is no clear showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse possession; and the burden shifts to the opposing party to explain such possession. However, if a claimant's use of the property is shown to be permissive, then he cannot acquire title by adverse possession.

Facts:

Henry and Simona Prado purchased their lot in 1966, mistakenly thinking that it included a strip of land beyond its actual eastern boundary. Roughly twenty years passed as the Prados continued to believe the land was theirs and used it accordingly. In the late 1980s, Tracy and Norma Lampman bought the tract immediately to the east of the Prados that included the narrow parcel, at least according to recorded documents. While the owners of each lot apparently believed they owned the strip of land, another score of years passed before their conflicting beliefs became evident. In 2011, Christopher and Tami Graybill entered into a contract for deed with the Prados, took possession of their lot, and began using the disputed parcel. A 2011 survey established the true property line, and the Lampmans fenced the parcel off, triggering this lawsuit. Appellants (the Waybills and Prados, collectively) claimed to own the disputed area by adverse possession. The district court found that they did not and quieted title in the Lampmans. 

Issue:

Did the appellants sufficiently establish a prima facie case for adverse possession in the favor of the Prados?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

Re: actual possession

The disputed parcel can fairly be characterized as in a rural residential area. The Prados began to maintain and use the contested parcel as they did the rest of their property in 1966. It was undisputed that from 1966 until at least 1989, no one other than the Prados maintained or made use of it. The district court specifically found that "[n]o evidence indicated that anyone other than [the] Prados used the disputed tract from 1966 until 1989." The Prados' actions were conspicuous and consistent with their mistaken belief that the parcel was part of their lot. Thus, the Prados actually and continuously possessed the disputed property for a period of at least 10 years, beginning in 1966.

Re: open and notorious possession

The district court correctly concluded that the Prados' use of the disputed parcel was "open and notorious in that anyone, including the owners of the [Lampmans' lot], could and should have seen it." The Prados maintained the parcel by watering and mowing it, and they used it as they did the rest of their property, including for numerous family functions. There is no evidence that anyone other than the Prados openly and notoriously used or maintained the disputed property from 1966 to 1989. Thus, the Prados' possession was continuously notorious for a period of at least 10 years beginning in 1966.

Re: exclusive possession

In concluding that the Prados' use of the parcel was not exclusive, the district court found that the Prados did not construct or maintain a fence to exclude others from the disputed tract. However, it is not necessary that a party prove a complete enclosure. The disputed parcel has always been included within what would appear to be the Prados' property: currently by a fence built by the Lampmans; a tree line; and a distinction in vegetation—all of which under these circumstances are adequate to establish exclusivity. The Prados never needed to build a fence, as they did not graze cattle or have any other reason to do so. Their use of the disputed parcel is consistent with that which would ordinarily be exercised by an owner in using land to the exclusion of others. The district court also erred by expanding the time frame to the period after the Lampmans purchased their lot in 1989. The appropriate point in time for purposes of analyzing Appellants' adverse possession claim was decades earlier, and the undisputed evidence is that from 1966 through at least 1989, the Prados' possession was exclusive, as the record confirms that they did not share possession of the parcel with the Lampmans' predecessors in interest or anyone else. The Prados alone cared for the disputed parcel and used it as if it was their own throughout those years. At best, the Lampmans would have begun using the property in 1989. Prior to that time, there is no evidence in the record that anyone other than the Prados exercised exclusive dominion over the disputed parcel.

Re: hostile possession

The evidence here clearly indicates that the Prados believed that the disputed property was theirs, and treated it as such from 1966 to 1989, and arguably well beyond. While the district court considered the timeframe after the Lampmans purchased their lot in 1989, there is no evidence that any of the previous owners of that lot gave the Prados permission to use the disputed property, or that the Prados' use was anything but hostile.

Re: continuous possession

The term "continuous" for purposes of adverse possession equates to possession for the statutorily required period, and that possession must be uninterrupted or maintained without break or interlude. As already concluded, Appellants established continuity of all the other elements of adverse possession for a period of at least 10 years, from 1966 until 1989, and perhaps beyond.

In sum, Appellants presented the requisite prima facie case, and that the Prados are presumed to have adversely possessed the disputed parcel. The burden then shifts to the Lampmans to explain that possession and show that it was permissive. A review of the record confirms that the Lampmans have not satisfied their burden to show that the Prados' use from 1966 to 1989 was permissive. Thus, title of the disputed parcel vested in the Prados in 1976, and they were entitled to use it as they could any other real property they owned.