Hagans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. - 694 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2012)

Rule:

More deference is granted under Skidmore's sliding scale test when the agency's interpretation is issued contemporaneously with a statute. Less deference is afforded when an agency's interpretation is inconsistent with its prior positions. When determining what deference to give to an agency's actions under Skidmore, the most important considerations are whether the agency's interpretation is consistent and contemporaneous with other pronouncements of the agency and whether it is reasonable given the language and purpose of the statute.

Facts:

Until January 2003, Mark Hagans worked as a security guard for a federal agency and as a sanitation worker for the city of Newark. That month, however, when he was 44 years old, Hagans began suffering from chest pains. He required immediate open-heart surgery to repair a dissecting aortic aneurysm, a potentially life-threatening condition. Hagans was hospitalized for the surgery and recovery during intermittent periods between January 29, 2003, and February 28, 2003. He then spent approximately three months in a rehabilitation center, where he underwent physical and speech therapy. He left this facility sometime in April or May of 2003. In addition to his heart ailment, Hagans claimed he has underlying medical problems relating to his cerebrovascular and respiratory systems, as well as hypertension and dysphagia (difficulty in swallowing). Hagans also complains of other issues, such as insomnia and back pain, which he alleges affect his ability to stand, sit, and lift. He has also been diagnosed with depression.

Hagans's initial application for disability benefits was granted and he began receiving benefits as of January 30, 2003. On September 21, 2004, however, pursuant to an updated Residual Function Capacity ("RFC") assessment showing Hagans's condition had improved, the SSA determined that Hagans was no longer eligible for benefits because his disability had terminated on September 1, 2004. Hagans's appeal to a Disability Hearing Officer was denied. Hagans continued to pursue an appeal and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in September 2008, at which he was unrepresented by counsel. On February 26, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Hagans's disability had ceased on September 1, 2004. Specifically, the ALJ found that Hagans's condition had improved and he was capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity, although he could not perform his past relevant work. On May 21, 2009, the Appeals Council denied review, which rendered the ALJ's opinion the final decision of the SSA.Hagans then filed the instant action. On April 8, 2011, the District Judge affirmed the SSA's decision that Hagans's eligibility for disability benefits ended on September 1, 2004.

Issue:

Did the SSA correctly evaluated Hagans's condition as of the date on which the agency first found that Hagans's eligibility for disability benefits ceased?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

After applying an appropriately high level of deference under Skidmore, the court found the SSA's interpretation of § 423(f) sufficiently persuasive to defer to it. While it may not be the interpretation that the court would adopt if it were to engage in an independent review, the interpretation contained in AR 92-2(6) represented the considered judgment of the agency and was in accordance with the SSA's statutory mandate to set rules for the governance of the disability insurance program. Essentially, the SSA conceptualizes the cessation scheme as one in which there is a single determination followed by several layers of review. Under this view, the terms "now" and "current" in § 423(f) refer to the date of the initial finding that a recipient's disability has ceased. Therefore, the ALJ's role in a cessation proceeding is to review the SSA's determination that a benefits recipient was not eligible for benefits as of a fixed, specific date, not to determine whether he might have become eligible at some later time. The SSA's interpretation found support in the fact that the Social Security Act requires that a "period of disability" be "continuous" and requires the filing of an application for benefits in order to begin such a period. The Social Security program is thus designed to prevent any breaks in the continuity of a period of disability and the attendant benefits that flow from such a disability. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized, allowing an ALJ to consider a benefits recipient's status several years after the initial determination that the recipient was no longer disabled would potentially allow a break in continuity in contravention of the statute. Moreover, the Social Security Act was designed to ensure that benefits would accrue only during periods of time in which a person is truly unable to work. If Hagans was capable of working as of September 1, 2004,  but became classifiable as disabled on some later date, allowing him to receive disability benefits for that interim period when he was not disabled would thwart the purpose of the SSA.