Hamilton v. Hamilton - 317 Ark. 572, 879 S.W.2d 416 (1994)

Rule:

An appellate court engages in the following exercise in assessing whether a rational basis for a classification in a statute exists: On an equal protection challenge to a statute, it is not the court's role to discover the actual basis for the legislation. Instead the court merely considers whether any rational basis exists which demonstrates the possibility of a deliberate nexus with state objectives, so that the legislation is not the product of utterly arbitrary and capricious government purpose and void of any hint of deliberate and lawful purpose. Further, the party challenging the legislation has the burden of proving that the act is not rationally related to achieving any legitimate objective of state government under any reasonably conceivable state of facts.

Facts:

The deceased left property to his widow, appellee Virginia Hamilton, and daughters, appellants Melinda R. Hamilton and Maron M. Hamilton, in his will. Appellee renounced her rights under the will and filed her election to take her share against the will of her husband under Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-401 (1987). The appellee’s action would result in a diminution of the estate for the appellants. Subsequently, appellants filed a motion to declare § 28-39-401 unconstitutional on its face and as applied, arguing that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. The appellants highlighted the disparate treatment in the statutes between divorced spouses with division of property under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315 (Repl. 1993) and surviving spouses with their elective share rights under § 28-39-401. The appellants further asserted that appellee’s elective share amounted to a taking of their property without compensation under the Due Process Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The probate court found that the elective share statute was constitutional and that appellee was entitled to take against the will. Appellants challenged the decision.

Issue:

Did the Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-401 (1987) violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of both the federal and state constitutions?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-401 (1987) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and did not constitute an improper taking of property under the Due Process Clause. According to the Court, the reasoning behind appellants’ equal protection claims was flawed. The policy consideration behind the statutory division of property as part and parcel of a divorce was not the same as the policy consideration giving rise to the elective share statute. The former policy dealt with the dissolution of the marriage contract and the division of property. The latter was designed to prevent injustices when a marriage endured until the death of the husband or the wife. As such, providing for surviving spouses was a legitimate legislative purpose and salvaged the elective share statute from an equal protection attack. Anent the appellants’ due process claims, the Court noted that jurisprudence recognized the surviving spouse's right to an elective share as inviolate. The elective share provisions were designed to strike a balance between a testator's right to control the distribution of his or her property for life, while preserving the State's interest in protecting the surviving spouse. Therefore, a legitimate government interest supported the diminishment in the appellants' 0 shares caused by the appellee’s election.