Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai - 520 U.S. 548, 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997)

Rule:

Coverage under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688(a), is confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. An important part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker seeking coverage has a substantial connection to a vessel or a fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control. The substantial connection test is important in distinguishing between sea- and land-based employment, for land-based employment is inconsistent with Jones Act coverage.

Facts:

Respondent Papai was injured while painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow. Petitioner Harbor Tug & Barge Co., the tug's operator, had hired him to do the work, which was expected to last one day and would not involve sailing with the vessel. Respondent had been employed by Harbor Tug on 12 previous occasions in the 2 1/2 months before his injury, receiving those jobs through the Inland Boatman's Union (IBU) hiring hall. He had been getting short-term jobs with various vessels through the hiring hall for about 2 1/4 years. Most of those were deckhand work, which respondent said involved manning the lines on- and off-board vessels while they dock or undock. Respondent sued Harbor Tug, claiming, inter alia, negligence under the Jones Act, and his wife joined as a plaintiff, claiming loss of consortium. The District Court granted petitioner’s summary judgment upon finding that respondent did not enjoy seaman status under the Jones Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing and remanding, expressed the view that for purposes of the individual's Jones Act claim, it would have been reasonable for a jury to conclude that the individual's relationship with a vessel or a group of vessels was substantial in terms of duration and nature, considering the total circumstances of the individual's employment. Moreover, a worker should not be deprived of seaman status under the Jones Act simply because the industry operated under a daily assignment system rather than a permanent employment system. Certiorari was granted. 

Issue:

Could the respondent qualify for seaman status, within the coverage of Jones Act, on the basis of his short-term jobs with petitioner? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On certiorari, the Court held that the essential requirements for seaman status were twofold, first an employee's duties must have contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of the mission, and second, the seaman must have had a connection to a vessel in navigation that was substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. The Court held that as respondent was hired to paint for one day, it was not sufficient to establish seaman status under the group of vessels concept. According to the Court, the respondent’s recent discrete engagements for the petitioner were separate from the one during which the individual allegedly was injured, which engagement was the sort of transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel or group of vessels that did not qualify one for seaman status.