Harmelin v. Michigan - 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991)

Rule:

Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout the nation's history. A sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual does not become so simply because it is "mandatory."

Facts:

A Michigan statute provided a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for possession of 650 grams or more of any mixture containing certain controlled substances, including cocaine. Petitioner Ronald Harmelin, who was convicted under Michigan law of possessing 672 grams of cocaine, received such a mandatory sentence. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction because evidence supporting it had been obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals, vacating its prior decision and affirming petitioner’s sentence, rejected the argument that the sentence was "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment, which prohibited cruel and unusual punishments. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and petitioner was granted certiorari.

Issue:

Was the mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole a “cruel and unusual” punishment within the meaning of the Federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the fact that the sentencing judge, in being statutorily required to impose a life sentence without possibility of parole, could not take into account the particularized circumstances of the crime and of the criminal, including such mitigating factors as the accused's lack of any prior felony convictions, did not make the sentence "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, because severe mandatory penalties were not unusual in the constitutional sense. According to the Court, severe mandatory penalties have been employed in various forms throughout the nation's history, and a sentence which was not otherwise cruel and unusual would not become so simply because it was mandatory. The Court further refused to extend its "individualized capital-sentencing doctrine"--under which the court has held that a capital sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment if it was imposed without an individualized determination that the punishment was appropriate--to an "individualized mandatory life in prison without parole sentencing doctrine," because there was a qualitative difference between death and all other penalties, since death was totally irrevocable, while even a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole was subject to retroactive legislative reduction or executive clemency.