Thank You For Submiting Feedback!
Where one voluntarily fires a loaded pistol at another, without excuse and not under circumstances of justification, and kills the person at whom he shot, the law will hold the slayer responsible for the consequences of his act. It conclusively presumes malice on the part of the slayer, and the grade of the homicide, so committed, will not be reduced to involuntary manslaughter, even if the intent of the slayer, under such circumstances, was to wound or cripple the deceased, and not to kill.
J. W. J. Harris was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and his punishment was fixed by the verdict at not less than ten nor more than fifteen years. His motion for a new trial was overruled, and he excepted.
Was the trial court’s judgment convicting Harris of voluntary manslaughter proper?
The court noted that there was no issue as to physical evidence because the objects in question were admitted by the State without objection. The court held that the charge did not have the effect of withdrawing from the consideration of the jury the physical objects, nor was there error requiring a new trial. Defendant also argued that the trial court erred in failing to charge the law on involuntary manslaughter. The court observed that the trial court used O.C.G.A. § 26-1007, which defined voluntary manslaughter, omitting part of the definition, then defined the meaning of "a serious personal injury on the person killing," and the meaning of "other equivalent circumstances," as used in § 26-1007. The court held that the trial court was right in charging the law of voluntary manslaughter, so it was not error to define the offense in the words of the statute, and then to explain the technical terms contained in the definition.