Hertz Corp. v. Jackson - 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)

Rule:

Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, an owner who gives authority to another to operate the owner's vehicle, by either express or implied consent, has a nondelegable obligation to ensure that the vehicle is operated properly. However, limited exceptions to the strict liability imposed under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine have been recognized by the court. The court has specifically held that: 1) one who leaves a vehicle with a repair service is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of an employee of the repair service, and 2) a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft will relieve an owner of responsibility for the negligence of one to whom the owner has granted consent to operate the vehicle.

Facts:

Respondents, accident victim and his mother, brought action under a theory of negligent entrustment against petitioner car rental company after respondent accident victim was injured by a vehicle owned by petitioner. Petitioner was found liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for damages caused by the driver, even though the vehicle was obtained by fraud and reported as stolen, and petitioner sought review. A question was certified to determine whether petitioner's liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was affected by the facts that the rental was secured by fraud, the period for which the vehicle was rented was greatly exceeded and/or petitioner made efforts to recover the vehicle after it became aware of the fraud, and the vehicle was not timely returned.

Issue:

Could the petitioner be held liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, notwithstanding the fact that the car rental was obtained by fraud? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court noted that there were limited exceptions to the strict liability imposed under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The court has specifically held that: 1) one who left a vehicle with a repair service was not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of an employee of the repair service, and 2) a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft will relieve an owner of responsibility for the negligence of one to whom the owner has granted consent to operate the vehicle. In this case, the court held that the facts supported the conclusion that a theft of conversion had occurred. Because the vehicle was the subject of a theft or conversion, petitioner's consent was vitiated, and the vehicle was no longer on public highways by authority of petitioner.