Hicks v. Casablanca Records - 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)

Rule:

Courts, in addressing the scope of First Amendment protections of speech, have engaged in a balancing test between society's interest in the speech for which protection is sought and the societal, commercial, or governmental interests seeking to restrain such speech. Unless there appears to be some countervailing legal or policy reason, courts have found the exercise of the right of speech to be protected. The absence or presence of deliberate falsifications, or an attempt by a defendant to present disputed events as true, determines whether the scales in this balancing process shall tip in favor of or against the protection of the speech at issue.

Facts:

The late Dame Agatha Christie was one of the best-known mystery writers in modern times. During her life, she agreed to the use of her name in connection with various motion pictures and plays based on her works. Upon her death, the rights in her works descended to plaintiffs, Rosalind Christie Hicks, her sole legatee, and plaintiffs, Agatha Christie, Ltd. and William Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., as her assignees. In the winter of 1977, defendants Casablanca Records and Filmworks, First Artists Corporation, and Warner Brothers Inc. began filming a movie that, like the book in the related case, presented a fictionalized account of a true incident that occurred during the life of the author. Plaintiffs brought separate actions against the defendants to enjoin them from distributing the movie and a novel. In seeking preliminary injunctions, plaintiffs asserted their right to recover on the basis of the recently developing law of the right of publicity. Defendants brought motions to dismiss the actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on the ground that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court then consolidated the actions.

Issue:

Should the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaints be granted?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood that they would prevail on the merits. The court found that the interests in the movie and the novel should be protected, adding to the fact that there was no countervailing legal or policy grounds against such protection. The court ruled that the absence of deliberate falsifications or an attempt by the defendants to present the disputed events as true tipped the balance in favor of protecting the defendants' speech. Thus, the court held that since there were no deliberate falsifications, and the reader of the novel in the book case by the presence of the word novel would know that the work was fictitious, the court ruled that the First Amendment protection accorded to novels and movies outweighed whatever publicity rights plaintiffs had.