Illinois v. Somerville - 410 U.S. 458, 93 S. Ct. 1066 (1973)

Rule:

Where the declaration of a mistrial implements a reasonable state policy and aborts a proceeding that at best would have produced a verdict that could have been upset at will by one of the parties, the defendant's interest in proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and equally legitimate demand for public justice.

Facts:

An accused was convicted of theft in an Illinois state court after the court, at an earlier trial for the same offense, declared a mistrial on the state's motion, and over the accused's objection, because the indictment was fatally deficient under Illinois law. On the accused's petition for habeas corpus, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed

Issue:

Did the declaration of a mistrial over the defendant's objection, because the trial court concluded that the indictment was insufficient to charge a crime, necessarily prevent a State from subsequently trying the defendant under a valid indictment?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that (1) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not bar the respondent's retrial under a valid indictment, and (2) the mistrial met the "manifest necessity" requirement, because the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the "ends of public justice" would be defeated by allowing the trial to continue. The Court observed that the error would make reversal on appeal a certainty, and it would not serve the ends of public justice to require that the state proceed with its proof when, if it succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be stripped of that success by an appellate court. The fatal defect was a non-waivable jurisdictional defect, which could not be cured by amendment.