In re ESTATE OF SOPER - 196 Minn. 60, 264 N.W. 427 (1935)

Rule:

It is sometimes said that the intent of the testator is to be derived by a "four-cornered" view of the will. Words used may or may not be given their technical meaning. They are to be given such meaning as gives effect to the real intent of the testator. Such words as heirs, or legal heirs, though their technical significance is not to be overlooked, may, to give effect to the testator's intent, be held to refer to others than those who are technically heirs and may exclude those who are technically heirs.

Facts:

Ira Collins Soper abandoned his wife under circumstances designed by him to leave impression of having committed suicide. He then came to Minneapolis and there assumed the name John W. Young and was so known until his death some 11 years later. Young and Karstens formed a private corporation known as the Young Fuel Company. Thereafter they entered into agreement with a trust company under terms of which each was to take out policy of insurance upon his own life, payable to the trust company as beneficiary, and it was to turn over to the wife of either Young or Karstens, whoever happened to die first, the insurance money when collected, and was also to deliver to survivor the stock owned by decedent in the corporate enterprise. The insurance premiums were to be paid by the corporation. When this arrangement was made Karstens had been a married man over a period of time, Young only a few months, he having gone through a marriage ceremony with defendant Gertrude Whitby. All parties dealt with each other in the belief that Gertrude was the true wife of Young. Young later died, and the trustee collected the insurance money, paying the same to Gertrude, and delivered to survivor Karstens the corporate stock of Young. Later, Mrs. Soper, true wife of Young, brought this suit to recover the insurance money from Gertrude and the trustee.

Issue:

Was the parol evidence rule violated by resort to extrinsic circumstances because ambiguity appeared, not from the face of the agreement, but upon application thereof to its subject matter?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court found that Gertrude could not take anything as the "wife" of the deceased. However, the court found that parol proof was admissible to show that Gertrude was intended as the beneficiary, and not Mrs. Soper. Plaintiffs asserted that the agreement was not subject to construction, that it was perfectly plain in its language, and that the only thing for the court to determine was whether plaintiff was the lawful wife of deceased. The court, however, found that the writer of the insurance policy meant by the term "wife," Gertrude, and not Mrs. Soper. Accordingly, the court affirmed.