In re in re Doe - 159 Ill. 2d 347, 202 Ill. Dec. 535, 638 N.E.2d 181 (1994)

Rule:

Illinois law intentionally places the burden of proof on the adoptive parents in establishing both the relinquishment and/or unfitness of the natural parents and, coincidentally, the fitness and the right to adopt of the adoptive parents. In addition, Illinois law requires a good-faith effort to notify the natural parents of the adoption proceedings.

Facts:

John and Jane Doe filed a petition to adopt a newborn baby boy. In the adoption proceedings, the baby’s biological mother, Daniella Janikova, executed consent to have the child adopted four days after birth without informing the biological father, Otakar Kirchner, to whom she was not yet married. The biological mother told the biological father that the baby died shortly after birth. When the biological father discovered 57 days following the birth that the baby was alive, he filed an appearance to contest the adoption. The trial court granted the adoption, holding that the biological father was an unfit parent under section 1 of the Adoption Act (the Act) ( 750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1992)) because he had not shown a reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first 30 days of his life. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the biological father's consent was unnecessary under section 8 of the Act ( 750 ILCS 50/8 (West 1992)). Dwelling on the best interests of the child, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The state supreme court granted leave to appeal.

Issue:

Was the biological father an unfit parent under section 1 of the Adoption Act (the Act), thereby rendering the adoption proper?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On further appeal, the Court held that there was no evidence to support the finding that the biological father had not shown a reasonable degree of interest in the child. Rather, the Court noted that the biological father had no opportunity to discharge any familial duty because his numerous attempts to locate the child were frustrated or blocked by the biological mother, who was aided by the attorney for the adoptive parents. Because the father's parental interest was improperly terminated, the Court held that the intermediate appellate court erred in considering the best interests of the child and allowing the adoption. The Court further held that Illinois laws required a good-faith effort to notify the natural parents of the adoption proceedings. According to the Court, these laws were designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best interests of the child. If it were otherwise, few parents would be secure in the custody of their own children. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the lower courts.