In re Pennington - 142 Wash. 2d 592, 14 P.3d 764 (2000)

Rule:

A three-prong analysis has been established for disposing of property when a meretricious relationship terminates. First, the trial court must determine whether a meretricious relationship exists. Second, if such a relationship exists, the trial court then evaluates the interest each party has in the property acquired during the relationship. Third, the trial court then makes a just and equitable distribution of such property.

Facts:

In these consolidated cases, the court was required to determine whether the legal requirements to establish a meretricious relationship were satisfied so as to allow for equitable relief.

The first case involved Clark Pennington and Evelyn Van Pevenage (also known as Sammi Pennington), who met in March 1983 when they were still married to other people. Van Pevenage's divorce was finalized in December 1983, while Pennington separated from his wife in October 1983, but remained married until 1990. Pennington and Van Pevenage began dating each other and, in August 1985, moved in together at Pennington's residence in Kapowsin, Washington. The parties also commenced a sexual relationship. In 1987, Pennington purchased a lot in Yelm, Washington. He did so by assuming the underlying real estate contract on the land and agreeing to make cash payments of $ 700 per month. Pennington’s wife, Jane Pennington, quitclaimed her interest in the Yelm property to him in 1988. Pennington and Van Pevenage moved into the Yelm home in December 1988. Pennington then took out a loan solely in his name to pay off the real estate contract and finance construction of a hangar and a new home on the property, which he paid off using his income. Van Pevenage moved out of the Yelm residence from March 1993 until October 1994. In May 1994, Van Pevenage commenced a sexual relationship with another man, whom she resided with in September of that year. Pennington dated another woman during this time period. Van Pevenage eventually returned to the Yelm residence for one more year, before leaving again in October 1995. In 1996, Van Pevenage filed a complaint in superior court for dissolution of a meretricious relationship between Pennington and herself. The trial court concluded such a relationship did exist, determined that certain property acquired during the relationship should be treated as community property for the purpose of making a just and equitable division of such property, and awarded Van Pevenage a total judgment of $ 214,200, less amounts already received. Pennington appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

The second case involved James Nash and Diana Chesterfield, who began a casual dating relationship in August 1986 which eventually became sexually intimate a few months later. hesterfield was married, although separated, at the time she began dating Nash. Chesterfield filed for divorce in November 1987. The parties dated from 1986 until 1989, although Nash dated other women during this time period. In July 1989, Nash and Chesterfield moved into a home purchased the previous year by Chesterfield. While living together, Nash and Chesterfield opened a joint checking account to which they both contributed funds. The account was opened for the purpose of funding living expenses; it was used to pay the mortgage and taxes on the house, as well as groceries, utility bills, and other miscellaneous matters. Contributions to the account were initially equal, but over time Nash contributed more than Chesterfield. Nash and Chesterfield ceased living together in October 1993. Chesterfield closed the joint account and made a mortgage payment with the remaining funds. In 1994, Nash and Chesterfield briefly reconciled and began dating again, although they did not resume living together. They discussed marriage and Nash purchased a diamond for Chesterfield, but in November 1995 they permanently ended their relationship. Chesterfield filed a petition for disposition of property rights of a meretricious relationship in superior court. The trial court found Nash and Chesterfield had a meretricious relationship, certain property acquired during that relationship should be treated as community property for the purposes of making a just and equitable division of that property, and a 60/40 percent ratio in favor of Nash was the appropriate basis of division. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue:

Did the circumstances surrounding either of the cases justified the fair and equitable distribution of property acquired during the course of such relationship?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

Under Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995), meretricious relationships were defined as stable relationships evidenced by such factors as continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for mutual benefit, and the intent of the parties. However, such requisites were not met in the first case. When the factors and evidence are taken as a whole, the equitable principles recognized in Connell were not satisfied in this case. The findings of the trial court as to the sporadic cohabitation, the instability of the relationship, Van Pevenage's insistence on marriage, Pennington's refusal to marry, Van Pevenage's absences from the home and relationship with another man, the gaps where no expenses were shared, and the absence of constant or continuous copayments or investment of time and effort in any significant asset neither evidenced a meretricious relationship nor sufficiently justified the fair and equitable distribution of property acquired during the course of the relationship.

The second case similarly did not satisfy the equitable principles recognized in Connell. While the parties' continuous cohabitation and duration of their relationship did evidence a meretricious relationship, the evidence supporting the mutual intent of the parties to be in such a relationship was too equivocal to support such a conclusion. Similarly, the parties maintained separate accounts, purchased no significant assets together, and did not significantly or substantially pool their time and effort to justify the equitable division of property acquired during the course of their relationship. Therefore, the relationship between Chesterfield and Nash did not constitute a meretricious relationship and the equitable principles recognized in Connell were not triggered by these facts.