Jenkins v. Anderso - 447 U.S. 231, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980)

Rule:

An inquiry into prior silence is proper because the immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by offering himself as a witness. When he takes the stand in his own behalf, he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-examined. Thus, the defendant is subject to cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like any other witness.

Facts:

At a state prosecution for first-degree murder in a Michigan court, an accused who took the stand in his own defense sought to establish that the killing was in self-defense. Subsequently, on cross-examination of the accused, the prosecutor questioned him concerning the fact that he had not been apprehended until surrendering to governmental authorities about two weeks after the killing, and in closing argument the prosecutor again referred to the accused's prearrest silence, the prosecutor thus attempting to impeach the accused's credibility by suggesting that the accused would have spoken out about the killing if the accused had truly acted in self-defense. After the accused was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment in a state facility, the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court of Michigan denied leave to appeal. Thereafter, he sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, arguing that his constitutional rights were violated at his state prosecution when the prosecutor questioned him concerning his prearrest silence, but the District Court denied relief, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 

Issue:

Was the accused’s constitutional rights violated when the prosecutor questioned him concerning his prearrest silence? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the use of the accused’s pre-arrest silence to impeach his credibility violated neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Fifth Amendment guaranteed the right to remain silent, an accused who chose to testify was subject to cross-examination and could be impeached like any other witness. Thus, the Fifth Amendment was not violated by the usage of the accused’s pre-arrest silence to impeach his credibility. In that regard, the Court observed that the argument that the possibility of impeachment by prior silence was an impermissible burden on Fifth Amendment rights had been previously rejected. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was not violated by the usage of pre-arrest silence to impeach an accused as the common law had traditionally allowed that very practice.