John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co. - 563 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977)

Rule:

Fed. R. Evid. 408 does not require the exclusion of evidence when offered for the purpose of proving bias or prejudice of a witness.

Facts:

In May 1969, John McShain, Inc. purchased an aircraft manufactured by Cessna Aircraft Co. from Wings, Inc. for $282,136. In December 1969, several hundred landings and 147 hours of flight later, the main landing gear of the plane collapsed as the plane alighted on the runway in Baltimore. After notifying Cessna, McShain had the aircraft repaired by Butler Aviation-Friendship, Inc. at a cost of $11,734. During the course of the overhaul, Cessna representatives visited the Butler repair facilities. The plane was then returned to McShain. After 5 hours of further flight, the plane's landing gear once more gave way upon touchdown. The cost of repairs this time totaled $24,681. McShain refused to fly the craft again. Negotiations between McShain and Cessna regarding a new plane terminated when McShain filed an action in Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court seeking rescission of the original sales contract and the return of the purchase price. McShain then filed the present action against Cessna in district court, alleging defective design in the landing gear and Cessna's failure to correct that design despite knowledge of the defects. Before the conclusion of the eighteen-day trial, Cessna accepted liability for the first collapse on the ground that the existence of an understrength bolt had been discovered in the landing gear, and that that bolt was the cause of the original breakdown. The jury returned a verdict of $11,734 for the plaintiff as to the first accident, and a special verdict finding that there was no design defect in the landing gear. McShain moved for a new trial on the ground of six allegedly improper evidentiary rulings. The trial court denied the motion.

Notably, before the action was filed in the district court, the plaintiff signed an agreement releasing Butler from any liability for the accident in exchange for $10 and the right to engage as a consultant Ralph Harmon, who was at the time an employee of Butler's sister corporation, Mooney Aircraft Corp. Mr. Harmon was thereupon retained by McShain, and ultimately testified as an expert witness in support of the design-defect contention. Judge McGlynn allowed the release to be entered into evidence and read to the jury for the purpose of impeaching Mr. Harmon's testimony.

Issue:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the release as evidence?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

Judge McGlynn did not commit reversible error in admitting the agreement and in allowing comments upon it. The fact that a sister corporation of Harmon's employer had been released from liability in exchange for Harmon's testimony cast doubt upon Harmon's impartiality. Thus, as counsel for McShain appeared to contend at oral argument, McShain's claim is in reality that the potential prejudice from the admission of the agreement outweighed the agreement's probative value. In evaluating such an argument, it is acknowledged that the trial judge's familiarity with the tone and scope of the evidence presented to the jury puts him in an advantageous position to gauge the relative importance of potential prejudice and probative value. Nonetheless, the balance required is not a pro forma one. A sensitive analysis of the need for the evidence as proof on a contested factual issue, of the prejudice which may eventuate from admission, and of the public policies involved is in order before passing on such an objection. The substantiality of the consideration given to competing interests can be best guaranteed by an explicit articulation of the trial court's reasoning.