Johnson v. California - 545 U.S. 162, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005)

Rule:

A defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson's first step, which states that a defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.

Facts:

Petitioner Johnson, a black man, was convicted in a California state court of assaulting and murdering a white child. During jury selection, a number of prospective jurors were removed for cause until 43 eligible jurors remained, three of whom were black. The prosecutor used 3 of his 12 peremptory challenges to remove the prospective black jurors, resulting in an all-white jury. Defense counsel objected to those strikes on the ground that they were unconstitutionally based on race. The trial judge did not ask the prosecutor to explain his strikes, but instead simply found that petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under the governing state precedent, People v. Wheeler, which required a showing of a strong likelihood that the exercise of peremptory challenges was based on group bias. The judge explained that, although the case was close, his review of the record convinced him that the prosecutor's strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons. The California Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, but the State Supreme Court reinstated it, stressing that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, permits state courts to establish the standards used to evaluate the sufficiency of prima facie cases of purposeful discrimination in jury selection. Reviewing Batson, Wheeler, and their progeny, the court concluded that Wheeler's "strong likelihood" standard is entirely consistent with Batson. Under Batson, the court held, a state court may require the objector to present not merely enough evidence to permit an inference that discrimination has occurred, but sufficiently strong evidence to establish that the challenges, if not explained, were more likely than not based on race. Applying that standard, the court acknowledged that the exclusion of all three black prospective jurors looked suspicious, but deferred to the trial judge's ruling.

Issue:

Did Batson permit the State to require that an objector had to show that it was more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that a defendant satisfied the requirements of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination occurred. The Batson framework was designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process. The inference of discrimination was sufficient to invoke a comment by the state trial judge that it was very close, and on review, the state supreme court acknowledged that it certainly looked suspicious that all three African-American prospective jurors were removed from the jury. The Supreme Court found that those inferences that discrimination may have occurred were sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson. California's "more likely than not" standard was at odds with the prima facie inquiry mandated by Batson. The judgment of the state supreme court was reversed.