Johnson v. Governor of Fla. - 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)

Rule:

Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a substantial or motivating factor behind enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law's defenders to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor.

Facts:

Plaintiff individuals sued defendant members of Florida Clemency Board, arguing that Florida's felon disenfranchisement law, Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4 (1968), violated the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973. According to the plaintiffs, the racial animus motivating the adoption of Florida's disenfranchisement laws in 1868 remained legally operative despite the reenactment of Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4 in 1968. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the Board Members summary judgment. A divided appellate panel reversed. The panel opinion was vacated and a rehearing en banc was granted.

Issue:

Was the Florida's felon disenfranchisement law, Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4 (1968), violative of the Equal Protection Clause, thereby making it an error for the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Florida Clemency Board? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court noted that the subsequent reenactment eliminated any discriminatory taint from the law as originally enacted because the provision narrowed the class of disenfranchised individuals and was amended through a deliberative process. Moreover, there was no allegation of racial discrimination at the time of the reenactment. Thus, the disenfranchisement provision was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the district court properly granted the members summary judgment on that claim. The argument that 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973 applied to Florida's disenfranchisement provision was rejected because it raised grave constitutional concerns, i.e., prohibiting a practice that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted the state to maintain.