Johnson v. United States - 559 U.S. 133, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010)

Rule:

In the context of a statutory definition of "violent felony," the phrase "physical force" means violent force -- that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. Even by itself, the word "violent" in 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(e)(2)(B) connotes a substantial degree of force. When the adjective "violent" is attached to the noun "felony," its connotation of strong physical force is even clearer.

Facts:

Petitioner Johnson pleaded guilty to the possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. The Government sought sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which authorized an enhanced penalty for a person who violated § 922(g) and who “has three previous convictions” for “a violent felony.” Among the three prior felony convictions the Government proffered was Johnson's 2003 Florida conviction for simple battery, which ordinarily was a first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(b), but was a felony conviction for Johnson because he had previously been convicted of another battery. The District court concluded that petitioner’s conviction for simple battery constituted the use of physical force under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Accordingly, the district court enhanced petitioner’s sentence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue:

Did the Florida felony offense constitute a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the Florida felony offense of battery by “actually and intentionally touching” another person did not have as an element the use of physical force against the person of another, and thus did not constitute a “violent felony” under § 924(e)(1). According to the Court, nothing in the text of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) suggested that “force” in the definition of a “violent felony” should be regarded as a common-law term of art used to define the contours of a misdemeanor. Nor can any negative inference about the amount of “force” required by § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) be drawn from § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Accordingly, the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit was reversed, defendant's sentence was set aside, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.