Kadic v. Karadzic - 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)

Rule:

The liability of private persons for certain violations of customary international law and the availability of the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350, to remedy such violations is recognized. Private persons may be found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law. Individuals may be held liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.

Facts:

Plaintiffs, victims and representatives of victims of atrocities, brought an action against Radovan Karadzic, President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of "Srpska," in a United States District Court in Manhattan. Their claims seek to build upon the foundation of this Court's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), which recognized the important principle that the venerable Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), enacted in 1789 but rarely invoked since then, validly creates federal court jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the law of nations. The pending appeals pose additional significant issues as to the scope of the Alien Tort Act: whether some violations of the law of nations may be remedied when committed by those not acting under the authority of a state; if so, whether genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are among the violations that do not require state action; and whether a person, otherwise liable for a violation of the law of nations, is immune from service of process because he is present in the United States as an invitee of the United Nations. These issues arise on appeals by two groups of plaintiffs-appellants from the November 19, 1994, judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissing, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, their suits against Karadzic.

Issue:

May Karadzic be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity and for other violations in his capacity as a state actor?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court reversed and held that there was subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claim Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350, because aliens brought an action for a tort committed in violation of international law. Genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary execution were against international law and Karadzic could have been liable as a private individual. Although Karadzic’s foreign territory was not recognized as a formal state, it had the trappings of a state, including sovereignty over people and land. As a result, Karadzic may have been liable because he was the leader of a de facto government and was acting under color of law when the atrocities occurred. § 2(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 provided for subject matter jurisdiction through the Alien Tort Claim Act. Even though Karadzic was a United Nations invitee in the United States, Karadzic was not immune from service of process. Plaintiffs' claims were not a non-justiciable political question because of the nature of the claim.