Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. - 563 U.S. 1, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011)

Rule:

A complaint is "filed" for purposes of 29 U.S.C.S. § 215(a)(3) when a reasonable, objective person would have understood the employee to have put the employer on notice that the employee is asserting statutory rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. To fall within the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection. This standard can be met, however, by oral complaints, as well as by written ones.

Facts:

A district court found that respondent Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) by placing timeclocks in a location that prevented workers from receiving credit for the time they spent donning and doffing work-related protective gear. In the present antiretaliation suit against respondent, petitioner Kasten claimed that he was discharged because he orally complained to company officials about the timeclocks. The district court granted respondent summary judgment, concluding that the Act's antiretaliation provision did not cover oral complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A writ of certiorari was granted. 

Issue:

Did the Act’s antiretaliation provision only cover written complaints? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s decision, holding that the phrase "any complaint" suggested a broad interpretation that would include an oral complaint, but, the text alone did not provide a conclusive answer. According to the Court, limiting coverage to written complaints would undermine the Act's basic objectives as set forth in 29 U.S.C.S. § 202(a). The Court noted that before the Act was passed, illiteracy rates were particularly high among the poor, the workers most in need of the Act's help. To limit the scope of the anti-retaliation provision to the filing of written complaints could prevent agencies from using hotlines, interviews, and other oral methods of receiving complaints. A fair notice requirement did not necessarily mean that notice had to be in writing. The Secretary of the Department of Labor, and the EEOC had consistently held the view that the words "filed any complaint" covered oral, as well as written, complaints. The Court concluded that the statutory term "filed any complaint" as used in 29 U.S.C.S. § 215(a)(3) included oral as well as written complaints within its scope.