Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc. - 407 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2005)

Rule:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted use of a modified McDonnell Douglas approach in cases where the mixed-motive analysis may apply. After a plaintiff has met his four-element prima facie case and a defendant has responded with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action: the plaintiff must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (mixed-motives alternative). The question of pretext versus mixed-motive treatment is only reached after a plaintiff has met his prima facie showing under the modified McDonnell Douglas standard and the defendant has responded with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. If the plaintiff demonstrates the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employment decision (meets the mixed-motive showing), which may be achieved through circumstantial evidence, it then falls to the defendant to prove that the same adverse employment decision would have been made regardless of discriminatory animus. If the employer fails to carry that burden, the plaintiff prevails.

Facts:

Appellant Ivor Keelan, a citizen of the United Kingdom, worked as a regional sales director for defendant-appellee Majesco Software, Inc. (“Majesco”). He was hired as an employee-at-will. During his first four months on the job, Keelan generated no sales. Keelan was terminated for nonproduction. Appellant David Sullivan, a U.S. citizen born in El Paso, worked as a director of alliances for Majesco, as an employee-at-will. Sullivan produced no sales while at Majesco. Sullivan took an extended leave from Majesco and subsequently submitted his letter of resignation. Appellants filed a Title VII national origin employment discrimination case against Majesco. Both Keelan and Sullivan alleged that their sales performances were hindered and obstructed at Majesco due to the fact that they were non-Indian. Appellants also contended that Majesco’s inadequate marking materials and website hindered their sales performance. Moreover, appellants alleged they experienced discrimination in the terms and conditions of their employment and in Keelan’s termination and Sullivan’s constructive discharge. The district court held that the evidence did not support a prima facie case, and thereby granted summary judgment to Majesco. Appellants challenged the decision.

Issue:

Did the appellants show a prima facie case against the employer, thereby making the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer an error?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that Sullivan did not meet his burden of showing constructive discharge because (i) the requirement to work from the office and to work in a cubicle did not constitute hostility or harassment; (ii) all salespersons - Indian and non-Indian - utilized the same marketing materials and website; (iii) he presented no, much less compelling, evidence that his job responsibilities were reduced or that he was assigned to menial work in spite of his job title remaining the same; and (iv) there was no evidence that anyone ever badgered him by asking him when he was going to quit. Also, the trial court correctly found that Keelan had not met the discrimination element of the prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973) as (1) both Indian and non-Indian salespersons were affected by the blanket pay and commission cuts; (2) two Indian salespersons were discharged for the identical reason the employer gave for Keelan’s termination; and (3) the employees' statistical evidence did not show better actual treatment of the employer's Indian salespersons in circumstances nearly identical to the second employee's. Thus, summary judgment was properly granted to the employer.