Konradi v. United States - 919 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1990)

Rule:

The liability of an employer for torts committed by its employees, without any fault on his part, when they are acting within the scope of their employment, is called "respondeat superior," and it is a form of strict liability. It neither requires the plaintiff to prove fault on the part of the employer nor allows the employer to exonerate himself by proving his freedom from fault. The focus shifts from changes in care to changes in activity.

Facts:

While driving to work, Robert Farringer, a rural mailman, struck a car driven by the plaintiff's decedent, Glenn Konradi, killing him. Plaintiff brought the present suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., with a pendent-party claim under state law against Farringer. Plaintiff alleged that Farringer's negligence in failing to yield the right of way to Konradi at an intersection was the cause of the accident. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and the employee. Plaintiff appealed. 

Issue:

Was summary judgment properly granted to both the employer and the employee? 

Answer:

No, with respect to the employer. Yes, with respect to the employee.

Conclusion:

The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against appellee employee, but reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against appellee employer and remanded. The court determined that the trial court acted prematurely in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee employer because the state rule excluding commuting from the scope of employment was not strict, and the question of why appellee employer fired appellee employee was material. The court concluded that it could not say that the scope of federal employees' compensation was irrelevant to scope of employment for liability purposes. The court concluded that perhaps as the facts were developed it could become evident that appellee employee was not acting within the scope of his employment, but on the basis of the record compiled before the trial court, it could not be said that no reasonable jury could find that he was. The court concluded that by driving to and from work, appellee employee conferred a benefit on his employer because he was bringing an essential instrumentality of the employer's business.