Landry v. Hilton Head Plantation Prop. Owners Ass'n - 317 S.C. 200, 452 S.E.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1994)

Rule:

In the prior caselaw, the Supreme Court of South Carolina defines a licensee as a person who is privileged to enter upon land by virtue of the possessor's consent. A licensee is also defined as one who enters upon the land of another at the "mere sufferance" of the owner with the primary benefit being to the licensee. A landowner owes a licensee a duty to use reasonable care to discover the licensee, to conduct activities on the land so as not to harm the licensee, and to warn the licensee of any concealed dangerous conditions or activities. In other prior caselaw, the Supreme Court of South Carolina defines an invitee as one who enters upon the premises of another at the express or implied invitation of the occupant, especially when he is upon a matter of mutual interest or advantage. Unlike a licensee, an invitee enters the premises with the implied assurance of preparation and reasonable care for his protection and safety while he is there. A landowner owes an invitee a duty of due care to discover risks and to warn of or eliminate foreseeable unreasonable risks.

Facts:

Plaintiffs Nina and Charles Landry paid a premium on the price of their home in Hilton Head Plantation because it was located in a gated community with common recreational areas. Nina Landry alleged that she fell and broke her wrist when she stepped into a hole while walking across a sidewalk in one of these common areas. Consequently, she brought a premises liability action against Hilton Head Plantation Property Owners Association (Association), a corporation that owned and had a contractual duty to maintain the common areas. As homeowners in the Plantation, the Landrys were automatically members and part owners of the Association. Plaintiffs also included Tim McBride and Ronald Malphrus, doing business as Hilton Head Landscape Maintenance (Landscape Maintenance) as one of the defendants. Landscape Maintenance was the one which contracted with the Association to provide landscaping and maintenance services for the Plantation’s common areas including the area where Nina fell. The trial court instructed the jury that Nina was a licensee as a matter of law. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. On Appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in charging the jury that Nina was a licensee while in the common area where she fell and injured herself.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, was Nina Landry a licensee while in the common area where she fell and injured herself?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court first noted that defendants’ duty toward Nina Landry depended upon the latter’s status. The Court noted that there were distinctions between a “licensee” and an “invitee.” According to the Court, a licensee has been defined as one who entered upon the land of another at the “mere sufferance” of the owner with the primary benefit being to the licensee. According to the Court, a landowner owed a licensee a duty to use reasonable care to discover the licensee, to conduct activities on the land so as not to harm the licensee, and to warn the licensee of any concealed dangerous conditions or activities. On the other hand, an invitee was one who entered upon the premises of another at the express or implied invitation of the occupant, especially when he was there, upon a matter of mutual interest or advantage. Unlike a licensee, an invitee entered the premises with the implied assurance of preparation and reasonable care for his protection and safety while he was there. In the case at bar, Nina Landry cannot be classified as a licensee because, as a dues-paying member of the Association, she had a right to use the Plantation's common areas and did not need the Association's permission to do so. Nina Landry’s status while in the Plantation's common areas could be most accurately characterized as that of an invitee. Because Nina Landry was paying the Association an annual assessment so it can maintain the common areas for the members, she was clearly conferring a benefit on the Association that was essential to a principal reason for the Association's existence. Accordingly, the Court reversed on the issue as to the Association.