Larkin v. Grendel's Den - 459 U.S. 116, 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982)

Rule:

A statute must satisfy the following three criteria to pass muster under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.

Facts:

Pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138, § 16C, a restaurant operator's application for an alcoholic beverage license was denied by a city License Commission when a church that was located 10 feet from the restaurant objected to the application. On appeal, the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission upheld the License Commission's action. The restaurant operator then sued the License Commission and the Beverages Control Commission in federal court. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the statute violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the establishment clause of the First Amendment, held that the statute was void on its face, and held that the state's actions were not immune from antitrust review. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the District Court on the due process and establishment clause arguments but affirmed its antitrust analysis. A motion for rehearing en banc was granted, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment on establishment clause grounds without reaching the due process or antitrust claims and held that the statute was facially unconstitutional under the establishment clause. 

Issue:

Did the Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138, § 16C violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? 

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts, holding that § 16C violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Although the statute embraced valid secular legislative purposes, its principal or primary effect advanced religion because it conferred upon churches a veto power over governmental licensing authority. Moreover, the statute fostered an excessive government entanglement with religion because important, discretionary governmental powers were delegated to or shared with religious institutions. Section 16C substituted the unilateral and absolute power of a church for the reasoned decision-making of a public legislative body acting on evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant economic and political implications. The challenged statute thus enmeshed churches in the processes of government and created the danger of political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines. Ordinary human experience and a long line of cases taught that few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of the United States Constitution.